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developments in relation to employment and unemployment,
and in relation to poverty looking at various indicators and
looking at some affected groups in more detail. We finish the
section on each country with a discussion of the impact on
vulnerable groups, including some observations by Caritas
member organisations on their first-hand experience of
supporting them.
Part 3 | The Caritas Response
In this section, we look in more detail at the experience of
Caritas member organisations in the five countries and outline
some of the projects that they have undertaken to support the
people that they serve. The organisations work in different
contexts and in different ways, but their accounts of their
work help to illustrate on the problems that ordinary people
face. A common theme is the increasing calls that are made on
Caritas member organisations for basic supports and the ways
in which they are having to develop and innovate to address
this.
Part 4 | Conclusions and Recommendations
The background to the crisis is different in each of the countries
and it has impacted and evolved differently in each. This means
that there are both similarities and differences observable
between the countries in the impact on vulnerable people.
Before concluding, we draw out some general trends across the
five countries as well as referencing some dissimilarities. The
countries have in common:
5 High levels of unemployment, that, in four of the five
countries are well above the European average;
5 Very high youth unemployment levels in all five countries,
and marked increases within the past year in most
countries;
5 Long-term unemployment high in all countries and a very
high proportion of those who are unemployed are long-
term unemployed, indicating that the problem is becoming
structural;
5 Increases in income poverty in most of the countries, with
childhood poverty a particular problem in each and showing
an increase in all countries since 2007.
Many of the countries have gaps in their welfare systems that
leave certain groups – often casual or atypical workers or those
who reach the end of finite unemployment payments – in
extreme difficulty. Strong traditions of family support that are a
feature in each country are being severely tested in many cases.
This report looks at the impact of the economic crisis and at
the policy measures taken to address it focusing on five
countries that have been severely affected – Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Portugal and Spain. While the phrase ‘protecting the
vulnerable’ has been part of the terminology used nationally
and internationally relating to the measures undertaken since
2008, Caritas member organisations in these five countries are
daily trying to support people who are increasingly vulnerable
due to the impact of the crisis as well as austerity and
structural measures. The report is written in the knowledge
that the authorities have choices in deciding what policy
approaches to use and how measures are targeted – in other
words, who should pay most – and recommendations are
made in Part 4 for alternative policy approaches.
Part 1 | The European Crisis
Part 1 starts with a general overview of the causes of the crisis
in Europe, the official response to it, its impacts on Europe as a
whole and the outlook for the future. Some of the facts set out
here present a picture of a Europe in which social risks are
increasing, social systems are being tested and individuals and
families are under stress. The picture is one of a very sharp drop
in employment, and consequent increases in unemployment
particularly affecting younger people; growing levels of long-
term unemployment, which is becoming structural; high levels
of poverty, including childhood poverty, a deepening of poverty
levels and reductions in access to essential services. Overall,
economic sentiment in Europe is considered to be at its lowest
level in years, and growth projections have been increasingly
downgraded during the year 2012 by international bodies such
as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF is now of
the opinion that cutbacks have had a larger than expected
negative impact on output, and are recommending that
European policy-makers gradually ease financial conditions
further in the periphery economies.
The section concludes that, while austerity may be necessary in
some situations where people or societies have been living
beyond their means, the prioritization of austerity measures to
the virtual exclusion of other responses will not solve the crisis.
Part 2 | Impact of the Crisis on Five
European Countries
Here we look in detail at the position of the five countries,
sketching briefly the background to the crisis in each and
looking at their current public debt levels and their recent and
projected estimates for growth in GDP. We go on to reference
the kinds of policy-measures introduced, and examine
Executive
Summary
Focus of the Report
Main conclusions
5 The evidence presented in this report shows that the
Policy of Prioritising Austerity is Not Working and an
alternative is required. The approach of imposing austerity
measures and structural reforms aimed at reducing
government borrowing and the debt/GDP ratio within a
short number of years is not working in economic terms.
Simultaneously, it is putting the social cohesion of Europe
and the very political legitimacy of the European Union at
risk.
5 Fair Solution to the Debt-crisis must be found: The recent
EU agreement to recapitalise Spanish banks without adding
to sovereign debt (June 2012) recognises that making
taxpayers responsible for the massive debts of their banks
is unsustainable. Turning banking debt into sovereign debt
must be recognised as unfair and unsustainable for all
affected countries and a fairer burden-sharing approach
adopted.
5 Despite rhetoric to the contrary there is currently a failure
to integrate economic and social policies, and a lack of a
longer-term commitment to an inclusive society, which in
turn is necessary to building a sustainable economy. The
people paying the highest price currently are those who had
no part in the decisions that led to the crisis, and the
countries worst affected are amongst those with the
biggest gaps in their social protection systems so their
welfare systems are least able to protect their vulnerable
populations. This process is unfair and unjust.
Part 4 goes on to propose a series of recommendations aimed at
(1) The European Institutions and the Commission, (2) National
Governments, and (3) Non-Governmental Organisations. These
recommendations are made include the following:
European Institutions and EU Commission
5 Provide Leadership in relation to Groups at particular Risk
of Poverty,
5 Ensure an adequate social dimension to the Europe 2020
Strategy process for all countries,
5 Introduce Social Monitoring for Countries in EU/IMF Pro-
grammes,
5 Ensure that the 2014-2020 Structural Funds will play a bigger
role in addressing poverty,
5 Lead on Policy-development and Monitoring of Child Poverty,
5 Provide Leadership in Respect of Youth Unemployment,
5 Ensure the involvement of Civil Society in Governance.
National Governments and relevant Local
Regional Authorities
5 Strengthen Welfare Systems,
5 Strengthen Essential Services,
5 Poverty Proof All New Measures,
5 Use Appropriate Labour Market Active Inclusion Measures,
5 Frame any further measures such that those who can afford
to do so actually do pay more,
5 Consider how Government could become an employer of
last resort,
5 Ensure the involvement of Civil Society in Governance.
5 Introduce Better Monitoring and Planning.
Non-Governmental Organisations
5 Accompany and help people in need; provide services for
social and active inclusion,
5 Give a Voice to People Experiencing Poverty or Social Exclusion,
5 Document Increases in Service Use,
5 Work for Social Change,
5 Work to Influence Decision-Making.
Part 4 concludes with some comments on the role and
commitment of the Catholic Church.
As is clear from Part 1 of this report, the crisis in Europe and
the official response to it is leaving the peripheral countries in
Europe in a double bind. By cutting expenditure in an attempt
to reach the targets set for the debt to GDP ratio, they lose
revenue. This, along with interest payments and higher social
costs due to rising unemployment, makes their growth difficult
if not impossible. Furthermore, commentators like the IMF are
now noting an impact (or ‘spillover effect’) from the periphery
to the rest of Europe and, indeed, that Europe’s low growth
and uncertainty is also affecting emerging markets.
The recommendations in this report also have wider implications
beyond the five countries considered, and this is clearly the case
given that two of Europe’s largest economies (Spain and Italy) are
included in the analysis. The report’s recommendations point to
new approaches to addressing the problems of Europe that are
both socially just and sustainable. All countries need to recognise
that just as social and economic development are interlinked,
and in fact are two sides of the same coin, so pursuing austerity
measures alone will not solve the crisis in Europe. Instead
austerity is putting social cohesion and the very future of the
European Union at risk.
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THE EUROPEAN
CRIS I S
Part 1
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The economic crisis of 2007/8 and the austerity measures that
followed it aimed at reducing government budget deficits
were always going to impact on the incomes and the relative
positions of different income groups. While the general
recession affects incomes (due to reductions in market
incomes, increasing unemployment and underemployment),
the authorities also have choices in deciding what policy
approaches to use and how measures are targeted – in other
words, who should pay most. The mantra ‘while protecting the
vulnerable’ has been used repeatedly in the surveillance
procedures of the IMF and of the European bodies involved in
advising on and enforcing measures intended to address the
crisis. But in practice, Caritas member organisations across the
‘peripheral’ nations witness poverty, unemployment, exclusion
and distress amongst increasing numbers of people who rely
on their services.
The human cost of the crisis is impossible to assess fully at
this stage as its impact is still unfolding with wave after wave
of ad-hoc crisis driven measures and a series of structural
measures being implemented in each country. By examining
recent trends in employment, unemployment, poverty rates,
severe material deprivation and low work intensity in five
countries severely affected by the crisis, (Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal, and Spain) it is hoped that this report can contribute
to more awareness of the impact on more vulnerable groups,
and of alternative policy approaches that could be taken by
the authorities to alleviate its worst effects. We also hope
that the conclusions and recommendations outlined here,
which flow from this analysis concerning alternative
approaches and different choices Governments could make,
will be taken aboard by the decision-makers concerned and
acted upon so as to alleviate the extraordinary levels of
suffering which have been imposed unfairly on large numbers
of people in the period since 2008.
Parts Two and Three include accounts from the five countries
concerned of the first-hand experience of people directly
affected by the crisis from Caritas organisations, as well as
some of the measures they undertake to alleviate the problems
they encounter. Caritas organisations are on the ground in
these countries and address the challenges being faced by
those who are vulnerable on a daily basis. Their work ranges
from the provision of basic necessities to the poorest to the
provision of detailed analysis of the causes of problems and
their likely solutions. They provide a unique perspective that
has much to offer to policy makers at local, regional, national
and EU-wide levels.
Here we look, briefly, at the overall causes of the crisis and at
the official response of the main institutions concerned. We
then look at its key economic and social consequences for
Europe and at the outlook for the future.
Introduction
The crisis evolved in different ways in each European country
depending on a wide range of local circumstances. In this
general introduction it is not possible to discuss in detail the
course it has taken in each of the five countries under
consideration. Instead we attempt to outline the broader
context of the background to the crisis.
Nobel prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz has characterized
the global financial and economic crisis as likely to be the
deepest and longest economic downturn since the Great
Depression that followed the financial crash of 1929. He
describes it as having been caused by bad regulation and bad
financial practices in the US, which affected the entire world
(2009). Stiglitz attributes this lax monetary policy and weak
regulation of banks and financial institutions to an effort to
boost demand in order to keep the economy going – so poor
people who had no money were encouraged to keep spending
and a massive debt finance bubble enabled them to do so. The
underlying cause of the lack of spending by poorer people,
Stiglitz attributes to a rise in inequality over the past 30 years:
‘In effect, we have been transferring money
from the poor to the rich, from people who
would spend the money to people who do not
need to spend the money, and the result of
that is weaker aggregate demand’
(Stiglitz, 2009, p 7)
The massive expansion and lax regulation in the banking and
finance sector whose implosion was the trigger for the global
crisis in 2008, and indeed the rise in inequality that Stiglitz
refers to, is associated with economic theories and policies
Causes of the Crisis
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that arose in the 1970s which can be described as market
liberalism policies (Quiggin, 2011). These policies, based on a
belief that free markets are efficient,1 involved
5 removing state controls on the growth, use and flow of
capital, and
5 redistribution of income from the poor and middle classes
to the rich (Healy et al, 2012).
The first led to ‘financialisation’ which involved the creation of
new and complex financial products and to the lowering of
interest rates which led to increased investment in the
financial world itself and in property – and in turn led to huge
price increases and a property bubble in the US and elsewhere.
The bursting of the bubble in 2008 exposed the huge risks that
had been taken with lending and the precarious state of the
world’s financial institutions.
The second tenet is based on the famous ‘trickle down’
approach which assumes that policies that benefit the wealthy
will eventually benefit everyone. The evidence does not
support that hypothesis, however. As Quiggin points out, most
of the benefits of economic growth in the US, for example,
went to the top 1% of people; by 2007, the top 1% in the US
were receiving nearly ¼ of all personal income, more than the
bottom 50% put together (2011).
As Joseph Stiglitz concludes (2009), the problem is that the
system is now broken, because it was based on consumers
spending beyond their means by excessive borrowing,
something that cannot continue. That is not to say, however,
that lessons have been learned. As Quiggin argues, the concern
of policy-makers has been to restore the pre-crisis ‘normalcy’
as rapidly as possible, noting that, as the crisis has continued,
the focus of attention has turned away from the obvious
failures of financial markets and toward the alleged failures of
government (2011).
Other commentators point to fundamental problems
underlying the world’s economic development model that the
crisis has thrown into relief and that measures taken to date
will not address, pointing to the need for more radical
approaches aimed at producing a fairer and more just solution
(Healy et al, 2012).
1 That is, the idea that prices generated by financial markets are the best possible estimate of the value of any investment (Quiggin, 2011)
Europe has taken a series of measures in response to the
various stages and escalations of the crisis aimed at protecting
its weaker economies against pressures from the bond
markets.
Chief amongst them has been a determination that no bank
should fail and that the issue of budget deficits will be
rectified by the imposition of austerity measures and
structural ‘reforms’. The need for fundamental reform of
banking worldwide is accepted by many although rejected by
some. The overall approach reflects the view that cuts in
budget deficits will ‘promote ‘business confidence,’ particularly
if they are achieved through reductions in expenditure’
(Quiggin, 2011).
The European Central Bank, in particular, has taken the view
that if banks defaulted there would be a serious risk of
contagion. Of course, contagion has not been contained,
despite this approach, as lack of market confidence became
an issue in one country after another and the focus of the
crisis moved from Greece, to Ireland, Portugal and more
recently Spain and Italy. Nor has the approach ensured that
banks are working well – in the sense of making credit
available appropriately. The IMF, for example considers that
the forces hampering growth in advanced economies are
‘fiscal consolidation and a still-weak financial system’ (2012f,
p xv).
This approach has meant that in a country such as Ireland, for
example, burden sharing with bond-holders has not been
permitted. Revisions to the blanket bank guarantee originally
put in place by the Irish government in 2008 have not been
allowed and no ‘haircuts’ have been taken by the international
lenders who lent to Irish banks. Instead the responsibility for
paying the debts of private banks has been moved to the State,
and consequently to tax-payers and ordinary people (who did
not cause the problems in the first place). To achieve this a
series of tax hikes and cuts in public expenditure were agreed
with the IMF, the European Commission and the European
Central Bank equivalent to 18.5% of the GDP forecast for 2015
which has been directly removed by government from the
economy.
However, since June of this year when Spain, with an economy
considered ‘too big to fail,’ was confronted with a similar
banking crisis to that of Ireland, another approach is in
Ofﬁcial Responses to the Crisis
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contemplation (for Spain and Italy at least) enabling banks to
be recapitalized without adding to sovereign debt (IMF, 2012f,
p. xvi). Furthermore, there has been some burden-sharing with
bondholders in the case of Greece. So, at the June 2012
summit, and in response to the escalating problems in Spain,
European leaders agreed to start work on a banking union and
a single supervisory mechanism (the European Stability
Mechanism or ESM). Once established this would allow the
possibility of the ESM taking direct equity stakes in banks. As
the IMF put it, ‘this is critical because it will help break the
adverse feedback loops between sovereigns and banks’ (2012f).
The other part of this approach has focused on austerity
measures and structural reforms aimed at bringing
Government deficits and gross debt down to the levels
permitted in the Stability and Growth Pact – and doing so
within a short number of years. The two major rules on the
level of government debt and deficits are:
5 Government deficit must not be more than 3% of GDP
except in particular circumstances,
5 Government debt must not be more than 60% of GDP.
The Stability and Growth Pact came into force in 1998, but its
enforcement has always been problematic. It was amended a
number of times since then, notably in December 2011 with
the so-called ‘Six Pack,’ requiring stricter application of the
fiscal rules and sanctions for non-compliance. Some see these
moves as arising from a policy of ‘institutionalizing austerity’
(Quiggin, 2011).
Most recently all but two EU member States have agreed to
the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the
Economic and Monetary Union. As a result there will be a
‘deficit-brake’ and a ‘debt-brake’ and sanctions for a breach.
This involves a balanced-budget rule as part of national
constitutions or laws, and external oversight by the European
Commission, which will involve less discretion for national
governments over fiscal policy than formerly. Only those
countries who have signed up will be able to access the
permanent bailout European Stability Mechanism (ESM).
Each of the countries that are the subject of this report are
working to reduce their deficit levels to under the Stability
and Growth Pact target of 3 % of GDP through measures
aimed at increasing government revenue and cutting
expenditure. For all countries, but especially the ‘programme’
countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal) there is a lot at stake in
this process as their debt levels are such that they have largely
lost their ability to raise money on the markets.
Strict and short time limits for achieving these targets have
been set and reset as they have not been reached (as will be
evident from Part Two, below). The reality is that the countries
are, for the most part, in a double bind. Despite high
unemployment, governments are attempting to reach the
targets set by the European Stability and Growth Pact by
implementing policies that serve to deepen the recession. They
lose revenue as they cut spending, which, along with interest
payments, makes it impossible to cut deficits or to reduce them
sufficiently. With GDP falling, the 3% deficit target reduces
also in monetary terms, making it harder and harder to reach.
While it is acknowledged that some austerity is required to
reduce excessive spending and ensure government’s get best
value for the money they spend many experts believe that the
Eurozone’s current focus on cutting as much spending as
possible will not solve the crisis (Menendez, 2012).
Even the IMF is now acknowledging that cutbacks have had
larger than expected negative multiplier effects on output.
They have recommended that European policy-makers
gradually ease financial conditions further in the periphery
economies (IMF, 2012f, p xvii, 1).
All the countries that are the subject of this report have
committed to the Europe 2020 Strategy with its aim of
fostering inclusive growth, and its targets in areas like
improving educational attainment and reducing poverty2. The
Europe 2020 strategy requires the submission of annual
National Reform Programmes by member states setting out
their progress towards achieving its targets to which the
Commission responds with recommendations. However, states
that are subject to an EU/IMF programme are not required to
submit a separate National Reform Programme (Frazer &
Marlier, 2012). Thus it is of concern that, where programme
countries are concerned, the focus appears to have been
removed from the social targets of the 2020 Strategy. In the
case of Ireland, for example, the July 2011 country-specific
recommendations from the Commission refer only to
fulfilment of the loan agreements entered into under its
‘bailout’ package,3 which do not of course contain social
objectives.
This divergence from efforts to meet the objectives of the
Europe 2020 Strategy points to a lack of policy coherence at
a European level. It is hard not to agree with those
commentators (such as Frazer & Marlier, 2012)who are
concerned that economic priorities have taken precedence
over social priorities, at least in so far as the ‘programme’
countries are concerned.
2 The EU 2020 Strategy was adopted in 2010; it aims to turn the EU into a ‘smart, sustainable and inclusive economy delivering high levels of employment, productivity and social
cohesion’ (European Commission, 2010, p. 5). Its targets aim, amongst other things, to reduce poverty, raise employment, and raise educational levels.
3 ‘Implement the measures laid down in the Implementing Decision 2011/77/EU, as amended by Implementing Decision, 2011/326/EU, and further specified in the Memorandum of
Understanding of 16 December 2010 and its update of 18 May 2011.’
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The 2008 financial crisis led to the most serious economic
recession that the European Union has faced. The EU has again
been in recession or on the verge of it since late 2011. Both
GDP and employment rates were down for the EU over the
year to Quarter 2, 2012 (that is, EU27). The decline was -0.2%
in the case of employment, and -0.3% in the case of GDP
(European Commission, 2012, p. 5). The fall in economic activity
was associated with a decline in domestic demand and
investment, cushioned somewhat by increased exports. However,
weakening global demand is also holding back exports. The
decline in GDP in Europe is associated by the Commission with
negative effects of fiscal consolidation, as well as a weaker
international environment and a further loss of confidence
(European Commission, 2012, p 10). Meanwhile government
debt is increasing. It stands at an average of 84.9% of GDP in
EU27 and at a 90% average in the Euro area (Eurostat, 2012L).
Looking at the rates for quarter 2, 2012, Eurostat concluded
that even in Europe’s five largest economies (Germany, France,
Italy, Spain and the UK) growth was weak or negative
(Eurostat, 2012p, p5). Short-term perspectives are considered
very uncertain for Europe.
The latest review by the European Commission of the
employment and social situation concludes that social risks
are increasing (European Commission, 2012, p 5).
Amongst the most serious social consequences of the crisis are
those related to young people given their high levels of
unemployment (see below) and detachment from the labour
market since 2008, which may have lasting adverse effects on
their prospects. The European Commission describes the issue
as ‘the most urgent social matter of our times’ (European
Commission, 2012, p 26). It is envisaged that this may
deteriorate further leading to poverty and social exclusion and
other social challenges (European Commission, 2012, p 25). For
society there is also the risk of ‘losing the productive talents of
a whole generation’ (European Commission, 2012, p 25).
Long-term unemployment is another important consequence
of the crisis, because it means that unemployment is becoming
structural, and this militates against skills retention. At an
individual level it militates against re-entering the labour
market and it also adversely affects self-esteem and health
(the Social Protection Committee 2012, p. 24).
One of the problems of the current austerity measures being
implemented across Europe is that measures that result in
short-term saving can have very negative longer-term
consequences. Governments need to make assessments of
what the long-term impacts of the cuts to welfare and
services are in areas such as education, health and social care.
These are amongst a number of very negative trends that are
clearly identifiable in Europe in areas like employment and
unemployment, poverty and incomes and essential services.
Some key facts relative to these areas are as follows:
5 Unemployment has reached a historically high level of
25.7million people or 10.6% of the labour force in September
2012 (EU27), a rise of 2.1 million within one year (Eurostat,
2012n),
5 In addition to those classified as unemployed, an additional
19.5million people (aged 15-74) were identified in the EU
in 2011 as underemployed or a potential additional workforce4
(European Commission, 2012),
5 Long-term unemployed people reached 10.7million (Q1,
2012) roughly twice the figures seen in mid-2008 meaning
that two out of five unemployed people in the EU are on
average likely to remain unemployed for more than one year,
a trend likely to continue (European Commission, 2012);
5 The youth unemployment rate (under 25s) is 22.8%,
representing 5.5million young people in EU27 (September 12)5
Employment/Unemployment
(Eurostat, 2012n), with the greatest losses having occurred in
full-time and permanent jobs, and with a rise of young
people neither in employment nor in education (NEETs)
(European Commission, 2012),
5 The employment situation of migrants from third countries
has worsened due to the crisis, and their unemployment rate
(22.1%) stands at more than twice the rate for EU nationals
(Quarter 1, 2012) (European Commission, 2012, p 27),
5 Disparities have widened between member states with a
gap of over 20 percentage points in the unemployment rate
between the lowest rate (Austria) and the highest (Spain),
an all time record since harmonised statistics exist (European
Commission, 2012).
Key Economic and Social Impacts
4 This means that they are either part-time workers who are underemployed, or they form a category between unemployment and inactivity who are available for work but not seeking
it or seeking work but not immediately available
5 With a higher rate for young men than young women (23. 2%, men; 21.7%, women) as of July 2012 (European Commission, 2012, p 23)
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5 23.4% of the EU population ( 115.7million people ) were at
risk of poverty or social exclusion in 20106 an increase of
nearly 2 million since 2009 (Eurostat, 2012c),
5 When the at risk of poverty measure is considered, the share
of people living below the 40% threshold (that is, people
who are the poorest of the poor, living with less than 40%
of the median income) has been increasing since 2008 (The
Social Protection Committee, 2012, p. 13),
5 With a rate of 26.9% in 2010 (EU27), children were at a
greater risk of poverty or social exclusion than the rest of
the population in 21 of the 25 member States for which
data are available (Eurostat, 2012u); According to the
European Commission Social Protection Committee, child
poverty is becoming more of an issue and is likely to worsen
further, something liable to affect the life-chances of those
affected and their potential as adults, and to have a direct
impact on both the economic and social future of Europe
(The Social Protection Committee, 2012, p 19),
5 The rate of poverty for those who are working is a problem
across Europe and the average rate has increased slightly
between 2010 and 2011 (8.7%, EU27 average, 2011) (Eurostat,
Income / Poverty
2012g); the rate for those who are the least well educated
(that is, with lower secondary education or less) has increased
more, and has gone from 16.3% (in 2010) to 18.1% (in 2011)
(Eurostat, 2012v),
5 Inflation is rising faster than GDP and the main items driving
inflation upwards in 2011 have been food, commodity prices
and energy, which will disproportionately affect low-income
households (Social Protection Committee, 2012, p 6),
5 The share of the EU population reporting that their
households are experiencing financial distress remains
historically high; in households with the lowest income
quartile (that is, the bottom 25%), the share of people
experiencing financial distress has increased further in
recent years in the majority of Member States and was
observed to increase sharply in early 2012 (European
Commission, 2012, p. 5, 29).
5 European citizens perceive rising inequalities and view
this trend as a problem that goes beyond nationalities
(Eurobarometer, 2011 cited in the Social Protection
Committee, 2012, p 27).
5 For many countries austerity measures are leading to a
contraction or lowering of quality in public services that are
particularly important for people at risk of poverty or social
exclusion (Frazer & Marlier, 2012).
5 In many countries healthcare systems are under pressure to
reduce costs, and access to essential health and social
services has worsened during the crisis, according to a
recent Eurobarometer study showing that some people
report facing difficulties in accessing healthcare8 (The Social
Protection Committee, 2012, p. 6, 41).
5 Cuts in social spending have a strong impact on the
availability of social and health support services to the
public, especially to disadvantaged groups (The Social
Protection Committee, 2012, p. 45).
5 According to UNICEF’s major report on child poverty, it is
evident that front-line services for families are everywhere
under strain as austerity measures increase the numbers in
need while depleting the services available (UNICEF, 2012,
p. 49)
Access to Essential Services7
5 Despite the fact that the collapse of the housing boom was
the trigger for the economic crisis in several countries, the
EU Network of Independent Experts on Social Inclusion
concludes that policies in relation to housing and
homelessness have not been strengthened during the past
years and most consider that they have been weakened
(Frazer & Marlier, 2012, p 5).
There is, however, some evidence that some social protection
systems, particularly pension systems, have met their function
as automatic stabilisers in a number of Member States10
(Social Protection Committee, 2012, p 21). This seems to be
the case at least in the early years of the crisis and at least in-
so-far as it is possible to assess this on the basis of available
Eurostat data on poverty. This has occurred notwithstanding
the fact that pensions have not increased and have remained
largely unchanged due to the crisis (The Social Protection
Committee, 2012, p 20). Also, it is not the case in all countries
– in Greece, for example, pensions have been subject to a
6 See Glossary or see Part Two for a discussion of the term ‘at risk of poverty or social exclusion’
7 For example, health, education, social care, support to families, older people, people with disabilities and long-term care
8 32% of European citizens say it is more difficult to afford general healthcare, 38% say it is more difficult to afford childcare, and 40% say it is more difficult to afford long-term care
(cited in The Social Protection Committee, 2012, p 6)
9 This report contains a great deal of information on child poverty drawn mainly from 2009 statistics
10 Although it is also notable that there are lower pension entitlements in many countries for women due to short or non-existent working careers
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series of cuts at all levels of income and the at risk of poverty
rate for over 65s has increased (see Part Two).
Notwithstanding this, there is no room for complacency
relative to poverty in older age, as pension systems change
and more people are exposed to market risks. The Council of
the European Union has highlighted how the longer-term
implications of the crisis could be very serious for future
pensioners as the exposure of private pension schemes to the
volatility of financial markets becomes manifest. This, they
argue, requires policy-makers and regulators to promote more
prudent approaches to pension provision (2010).
The European Commission points out a difference between the
first phase of the crisis (up to 2009) and the second phase
since then. The welfare system and the taxation systems
played a stronger role in protecting household incomes in the
first phase, but cuts in benefits and increases in taxes have
eroded that protection since 2009 in those countries where
the recession is prolonged (European Commission, 2012, p 38).
The Social Protection Committee considers that, as long-term
unemployment as a share of total unemployment rises and
unemployment benefits run out, there is now a risk of seeing
a significant decline in disposable income, especially for low-
earners. Considering too that their propensity to consume is
high (meaning that they must spend their incomes rather than
save or invest them) this may have a long-term impact on
domestic demand and on overall economic performance (The
Social Protection Committee, 2012, p 15).
The EU Commission (2012) considers that overall economic
sentiment in Europe is at its lowest level in years. Recent
forecasts from the IMF, the European Central Bank (ECB) and
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) are also pessimistic and forecasts have been further
downgraded.
The IMF World Economic Outlook report, October 2012, revised
down its growth forecasts from those of only a few months
previously (IMF, 2012f). As they see it, in advanced economies
like the US and Europe, growth is now too low to make a dent
in unemployment. And what is most affecting growth is
financial consolidation and the weak banking/fiscal system.
The recession in most of the ‘periphery’ countries in Europe is
spilling over into the rest of Europe. According to a senior IMF
official, even core Euro countries, including France and
Germany, face similar problems on a more limited scale. Even
their economic growth is forecast to be low: 1% for Germany,
0.3% for France in 2012, and a bit higher for both in 2013
(Blanchard, 2012). Low growth and uncertainty are also
affecting emerging markets.
So far, the focus of the European Institutions has been on each
of the peripheral countries reaching the Stability and Growth
Pact deficit target of less than 3% of GDP. But, even assuming
that is reached, the overall debt reduction target of the
Stability and Growth Pact will also have to be attained (that
is, 60% of GDP for gross government debt). This means there
is a prospect of very long-term austerity measures, with its
attendant dampening of overall growth. Given the high levels
of child poverty, youth unemployment and long-term
unemployment in Europe generally and, in particular, in the
countries under review in this report (see Part Two), this could
be a recipe not just for one lost generation in Europe, but for
several lost generations. European Leaders need to present a
long-term vision for how this is to be avoided, and how,
instead, inclusive growth is going to be fostered.
A former senior IMF official has written that after a decade of
austerity the debt ratios of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and
Spain, Europe’s five most heavily indebted countries, will
remain at debt levels which leave them vulnerable until at
least 2017 (that is, with debt levels greater than 100% of GDP)
(Mody, 2012). He believes that the debt ratios will rise further
as the full extent of the austerity-induced damage to growth
becomes evident. He also thinks that growth will remain
‘throttled’ and debt ratios high.
He concludes that perpetual austerity is destined to fail, and
that European debt is impacting on the global economy as
indebted nations scale back imports from other European
countries and Asia with knock-on effects on world trade.
It has been commented that even if the policy of austerity and
structural reforms somehow calms the bond-markets it will
destroy the political legitimacy of the European Union
(Quiggin, 2011). It is difficult to conclude otherwise than that
the outlook is bleak for Europe as a result of the crisis, and
bleak also for the outcomes of the austerity approach in both
economic and social terms. It is clear that damage is being
done to European countries in the short-term and the longer-
term consequences, though unclear, could be much worse. An
alternative approach is urgently required, one that can be both
just and sustainable.
Outlook
IMPACT OF THE
CRIS I S ON FIVE
EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES
Part 2
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In this section we will look at the situation of each of the five
countries in turn looking first at their overall levels of
government indebtedness and their recent performance in
economic terms. We will then look at the policy measures that
have been introduced since the crisis began and examine
each country’s performance in areas like employment and
unemployment and in protecting people from poverty. Each
section will finish by discussing the impacts of policies on
vulnerable groups.
Government budgets were fundamentally affected by the
financial and economic crises in the period following 2007. Of
the five countries considered in this report, two were running
budget surpluses in 2007 (Ireland and Spain), others had
budget deficits within or close to the Stability and Growth
Pact limit of 3% of GDP (Italy and Portugal). One (Greece) was
running a deficit which exceeded the 3% of GDP limit, but the
previous years (2004-2006) had seen some decline in the level
of the Greek deficit (Eurostat, 2012k). By 2008 all five
countries were showing Government deficits, and by 2011
three (Greece, Ireland and Spain) had budget deficits much
above the EU27 average while two (Italy, -3.9%; and Portugal,
-4.4%) had deficits around the average EU27 deficit rate (of
-4.4% of GDP) (Eurostat, 2012k).
All have also seen substantial increases in their levels of general
government gross debt between 2007 and 2011 although they
Background – Government Budgets
vary considerably as to their levels prior to 2007. For example,
in 2004 Ireland, at one end of the scale, had a gross debt equal
to 29.4% of GDP and that for Spain was 46.3% of GDP. In
Greece, on the other hand, the rate was nearly equal to 100%
(98.6%) of GDP in 2004 and in Italy it exceeded 100% (103%)
of GDP (Eurostat, 2012j). By 2011 four of these countries had
the highest levels of gross debt in Europe as a percentage of
GDP: Greece (170.6%), Italy (120.7%), Portugal (108.1%) and
Ireland (106.4%). At 69.3%, the rate in Spain was still below
the EU27 average (82.5%). (See Glossary for definitions of
government deficit/surplus and government gross debt).
Four of the countries therefore exceed the gross debt level
(100% of GDP) that the IMF has identified as a significant debt
threshold, which is high relative to the historical experience,
beyond which political and economic forces tend to exert
downward pressure (IMF, 2012f).
Stiglitz (2009) draws attention to the important role that
welfare plays in operating as automatic stabilizers in a recession
– meaning that when the economy weakens, spending on social
protection and unemployment schemes should automatically
go up, helping to stabilize the economy – and the need to
maintain automatic stabilizers and social protections (2009).
Social protection systems vary greatly within Europe. Typically
systems like unemployment benefit work best for those already
integrated into the labour market than for those who are at its
margins – like temporary and casual workers. Progressive
taxation is also considered an automatic stabilizer in an
economic crisis in the sense that lower incomes (from reduced
earnings or reduced working-times) are taxed less heavily than
normal wages (Basso et al, 2011).
Southern European countries tend to have significantly smaller
mechanisms of automatic stabilization than Scandinavian and
Continental European Countries (Basso et al, 2011).
Researchers (Basso et al, 2011) have used a model to assess the
ability of the systems in different countries to withstand shocks
Welfare Systems
– that is, loss of income through wage-cuts and unemployment.
It is notable that all five countries that are the subject of this
report were below the European average (of 19 European
countries included) in terms of their ability to withstand these
shocks based on this modelling – which means that their welfare
systems were capable of replacing less income than other
countries.
In Italy, Portugal, Greece and Spain the tax and social transfer
system is described as providing ‘only weak stabilization for low-
income groups’ (Basso et al, 2011). That study identified a
particular problem with non-standard workers and new labour
market entrants (often young people) who experience less stable
jobs and also less social protection (Basso et al, 2011).
For its part, Ireland’s welfare system is considered to be a
mixture of the liberal approach associated with the US and the
conservative-corporatist approach of Continental Europe. The
liberal approach is characterized by services being purchased in
the market with residual means-tested benefits for those who
cannot afford them, often for a limited time only; Ireland’s
Introduction
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It is important to note that the main source of comparable
data on poverty and social exclusion, the EU Survey on Income
and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), has a significant time-lag
with data from 2010 being the latest available update for
some countries. However, data from 2010 and 2011 refers to
the situation for 2009 and 2010 respectively. Thus, the most
recent data available represents only the early impacts of the
crisis on poverty and income levels.
Another important point relative to the data presented here is
that there are different approaches to the measurement of
poverty and social exclusion. Under the EU 2020 Strategy11
headline targets have been set for reductions in poverty and
social exclusion (European Commission, 2010). These targets
are based on a combination of three indicators: 1) persons
who are at risk of poverty or 2) severely materially deprived or
3) living in households with very low work intensity. One of
the three measures, the ‘at risk of poverty’ measure, had
Statistical Issues
previously been the most prominent indicator at EU level. It is
a relative income poverty threshold, which means that it is
used to assess poverty levels relative to the national median
income, something that relates it to local conditions that shift
in line with changes in general income/salary levels. Thresholds
are assessed at 40%, 50% and 60% of median income with
the 60% measure being used most frequently. Thus the ‘at risk
of poverty’ measure depends on the local income poverty
threshold which means that it varies across Europe.
In this report data on poverty is generally taken from the
European Commission’s statistical body Eurostat, rather than
from the national bodies responsible for statistics. There can
occasionally be slight differences of definition and differences
of interpretation between national bodies and Eurostat. Using
the figures from Eurostat makes it possible to compare like
with like across countries.
tendency is to go more in the direction of the liberal model
(Healy et al, 2012a). In relation to unemployment benefit, for
example, one significant difference between Ireland and the
typical Continental European model is that in the Irish system
payments are flat and not related to past income.
This discussion points to a further risk for vulnerable groups in
the peripheral countries. In many ways the welfare systems in
these countries were at the outset of the crisis less well placed
than those of other European countries to withstand the shock
to incomes that the crisis involves, and less well able to protect
the poorest people from the austerity measures and structural
reforms that followed. In all five countries, there is a strong
tradition of family support, which is particularly relied upon
when services and social transfers are not adequate to meet
needs or where they are of finite duration. However, this can
place a large burden on families in difficult times. In Spain,
for example, the current period is considered by Caritas Spain
to be a time of greatly increased pressures within family groups.
11 The EU 2020 Strategy was adopted in 2010; It aims to turn the EU into a ‘smart, sustainable and inclusive economy delivering high levels of employment, productivity and social
cohesion’ (European Commission, 2010, p. 5).
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Between 1997 and 2007 Greece had an average rate of GDP
growth of 4% annually almost twice the EU average (Menendez,
2012). In 2006 the GDP growth rate was 5.5% when the EU27
average was 3.3% of GDP. However, the effects of the 2008
global financial crisis can be seen in the drop to negative growth
in 2008 (-0.2%). See Table 2, below, and Appendix 6 (which
sets out GDP growth rates, 2003-2013(f)). According to the
OECD, difficulties were brewing in Greece for years such that
when the economic crisis came, the country was significantly
more exposed than other countries (OECD, n.d., p 1).
One of Greece’s problems is tax evasion – between 1996 and
2006 the size of Greece’s shadow economy was estimated at
between 20% and 25% of GDP; another was excessive
government regulation and bureaucracy (Menendez, 2012).
Greece’s general gross debt as a percentage of GDP was
relatively very high throughout the 2000s, and, at 106.1% in
2006, was the second highest level in the EU27, just behind
that for Italy, at a time when the average in EU27 was 61.6%
of GDP. Since then Greece’s gross debt (as a percentage of
GDP) has overtaken even the very high levels of Italy. At
170.6% (or €355,658million) it stands as the highest rate in
EU27 in 2011. See Table 1, below, and Appendix 1.
Greece’s fiscal deficit has been above 3% of GDP almost every
year for 10 years in violation of the Stability and Growth Pact
(Menendez, 2012). In 2011 it stood at -9.4%. See Table 1.
Background and Government Finances
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Government deficit/surplus, % GDP -7.5 -5.2 -5.7 -6.5 -9.8 -15.6 -10.7 -9.4
General Government Gross Debt % GDP 98.6 100 106.1 107.4 112.9 129.7 148.3 170.6
Source: Eurostat, 2012j, 2012k, tsdde410, gov_dd_edpt1
GREECE TABLE 1 Government Debt Rates
When borrowing on the markets to refinance its debt became
prohibitively expensive, Greece required assistance from
European institutions and the IMF, which was made available
in 2010. However, ‘contagion’ nonetheless resulted in the
spread of the sovereign debt crisis from Greece, to Ireland and
Portugal, and eventually to Spain and then Italy as investors
either took their money elsewhere or sought higher interest
rates from countries perceived to have high debts.
When important targets were not met, further measures were
agreed in 2011. Following this agreement a further package
of assistance (€130billion) and a restructuring of debt12 was
made in 2012 involving a €1.4billion reduction in debt by way
of reduction in the interest rate agreed in 2010. There was also
additional finance for bank recapitalization (Thomsen Fasano,
2012). Banks, insurers and other private sector investors
holding about €206billion of Greek bonds took a 53.5%
reduction in the nominal value of their securities (Reuters,
2012). According to the European Commission (2012a), factors
that had hampered implementation of the measures that had
been originally agreed were political instability, social unrest,
issues related to administrative capacity, and a more severe
recession than anticipated.
The most recent economic assessment from the European
Commission confirms that Greece is in a deep recession, which
is now expected to continue until 2013 (European Commission,
2012b). Forecasts for growth have been further downgraded
and are shown in Table 2, below.
Greece
12 A senior IMF official describes the restructuring as having reduced the debt burden of every man, woman, and child in Greece by close to €10,000 on average (Blanchard, IMF, 2012).
However, there were no ‘haircuts’, the ECB and national central banks agreed to disperse profits made on Greek bonds back to Greece (Thomsen Fasano, 2012)
….the crisis is likely to have a signiﬁcant social cost….
OECD
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Amongst the measures introduced in Greece up to 2010 were:
5 A special tax on pensions (‘Pensioners’ Solidarity Contribution’)
with rates ranging from 3% to 10% (with pensions below
€1,400 exempt),
5 Abolition of special pension payments (the 13th and 14th
month) (partially offset by the introduction of an allowance
of €800 per year for pensions below €2,500 per month),
5 Raising of the child tax allowance (to €1,500, €3,000 and
€1,500 per annum for households with 1,2 and 3 children
respectively) (an attempt to cushion families with children
from the effects of other measures),
5 Increases in the standard rate of VAT from 19% to 23% and
in the reduced rates from 4.4% to 5.5% and from 9% to 11%,
5 Excise duty increased by 30% on fuel, tobacco and alcohol,
5 Personal income tax made more progressive with changes
including a personal allowance of €12,000 per year and an
increased top rate of 45% for incomes over €100,000 along
with a once-off (retrospective) tax of 1% of annual incomes
in 2009 over €100,000,
5 Tax base extended to include unemployment benefits, large
family benefits and contributory disability benefits for
people with a taxable income over €30,000 per year
5 Cuts and other changes to public sector pay, including
abolition of the 13th and 14th month salaries
5 Reductions in the tax allowed on charitable donations
(Callan et al, 2011).
A range of further measures have followed. These include
changes to labour laws (especially concerning collective
agreements), and there are plans for reductions in social
security contribution rates for employers (Ministry of Finance,
Greece, 2012).
Furthermore:
5 The minimum wage was reduced,
5 Unemployment benefits are being reduced in line with
reductions to the minimum wage,
5 Stricter conditions are being applied to availability of
unemployment benefits,
5 Suspension of the rent subsidy programme for low-income
employees,
Policy Response
5 Means testing of some benefits (e.g. large family benefit),
5 Reduction of others (e.g. family benefits for public sector
employees),
5 Stricter eligibility rules for some benefits (e.g. old age
solidarity benefit – EKAS)
(Ministry of Finance, 2012, p.27, 30, 32).
There have also been a series of measures by the OAED (Greek
Manpower Organisation) aimed at job retention as well as
training and employment. The Government estimates that
these measures have contributed significantly to reducing the
unemployment rate (Ministry of Finance, Greece, 2012, p 27).
On 7 November 2012 the Greek Parliament passed measures
worth €13.5 billion over two years, designed to ensure the
release of €31billion aid (by the IMF and the European
Institutions) much of which is required to shore up banks.
Measures will involve further and severe pension cuts, a two-
year increase in the retirement age to 67, tax increases and
laws that will make it easier to fire and transfer civil servants
(Reuters, 2012). There are also proposed cuts in health and
education spending (Caritas Athens, 2012). The measures were
met with protests in Athens by some 100,000 people and came
in the middle of a two-day general strike called by the
country’s two biggest unions.
Despite the pressure on the Greek government, and five years
into the crisis, it continues to exempt commercial shipping
companies, its most successful industrial sector, from all taxes
(Spiegel Online International, 2012). In addition, tax evasion
continues to be a major problem and a recent study suggested
that seven out of ten self-employed Greeks continue to
significantly underreport their incomes (Spiegel Online
International, 2012). This causes anger and frustration amongst
many Greek people affected by round after round of austerity:
‘in Greece, there is a breach of the social contract, which sinks
tax morale. People are angry and rightfully so’ (Friedrich
Schneider, Professor of Economics, University of Linz, Austria,
an expert on Greece’s shadow economy - Spiegel Online
International, 2012). Some of this anger is directed against
Percentage change on previous year
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 (f) 2013 (f)
EU (27 countries) 3.3 3.2 0.3 -4.3 2.1 1.5 -0.3* 0.4*
Greece 5.5 3.5 -0.2 -3.1 -4.9 -7.1 -6.0* -4.2*
Source: Eurostat, 2012a, tec00115.
*European Commission, 2012b - f: forecast. Figures described as provisional for each year - IMF forecast: for 2012: -6.0 %; for 2013: -4.0% (IMF, 2012f, p. 66)
GREECE TABLE 2 Real GDP growth rate - volume
The current aim is to achieve a primary budget balance by
2013 requiring additional measures of around 5% of GDP,
which are being adopted as part of 2013 budget measures
(European Commission, 2012b).
migrants and newspapers report severe attacks on migrants,
something that is being worsened by the rise in the far-right
politics evidenced by the rise of the Golden Dawn party.
In the Eurobarometer survey of the views of Europeans on the
social climate, Greece has been the lowest ranked Member
State in three of the last four years (in 2010 it was second to
Romania). Its index has declined in each year since 2009
(when the survey started) although the decline from -0.4 in
2011 to -5.8 in 2012 is much more marked than in previous
years, which in all likelihood reflects the increasing economic
and political turbulence being experienced by people there
(European Commission, 2012, p 43-46).
In 2011, the employment rate in Greece was 59.9% compared
to an EU27 average of 68.6% for people aged 20-64. Most
recently, the rate (at Quarter 1, 2012), is 56.4%, compared with
an EU27 average of 68%13. Greece experienced the worst drop
in employment levels in the EU27 in the last year to Quarter 2,
2012. The fall of9% represented 405,000 people. The decline in
Greece was far worse than the European average ( -0.2%)
(European Commission, 2012, p 13, 69). As Figure 1 shows, it
also extends a persistent downward trend observed since 2008.
One feature of the labour market in recent years is the
reduction in full-time posts and a growth in part-time or
‘rotation’ contracts (Ministry of Finance, Greece, 2012, p. 29).
Employment/Unemployment
The Greek government has also drawn attention to the issue of
large numbers of people who are economically inactive, which
in 2011 (4.37million, average) exceeded the number of people
employed (4.09million, average). This is explained by larger
numbers of people retired and people who are discouraged from
looking for work (Ministry of Finance, Greece, 2012, p. 24).
With employment declining, the unemployment rate has risen.
In 2011 it was 17.7% (Eurostat, 2012i). It has increased since
and stands at 25.1% at July 2012 (1.2million people) well
above the European average and the second highest rate in
the EU close behind that of Spain14 (Eurostat, 2012n, 2012o).
See Appendix 7.
Youth unemployment (age 15-24) is particularly high,
standing at 55.4% (June 2012), the highest rate in the EU
(June 2012) and nearly 2.5 times the average rate (of 22.5%)
(European Commission, 2012, p 72). The rate is increasing
rapidly, having increased by nearly 11 percentage points from
July 2011.
At 12.3% the long-term unemployment rate is the highest in
Europe and has increased dramatically in the year to Quarter
1, 2012 – by 5.2 percentage points – the highest increase in
the EU (European Commission, 2012, p 73). The share of those
unemployed who are long-term unemployed (that is,
unemployed for 12 months or more) was just under 50%, 2011
(Eurostat, 2012i).
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13 This data is from European Commission, 2012, from the EU LFS and is non-seasonally adjusted, p 71
14 The Spanish rate of 25.8% is given for September 2012, whereas the Greek rate is only given to July 2012 in Eurostat, 2012n
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GREECE FIGURE 1
Source: Eurostat, 2012b, t2020_10
2011 2012
Unemployment – rate (%) 17.7% 25.1% (July)
Unemployment – number of people 877,000 2.2million (July)
Youth Unemployment Rate (15-24) 55.4% (June)
Long-term Unemployment Rate (unemployed for 12 months or more) 12.3% (Q1)
Share of unemployment that is long-term 49.6%
Source: Eurostat, 2012i; Eurostat, 2012n, European Commission, 2012, p 72
GREECE TABLE 3 Unemployment-Headline Statistics
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Poverty: The Europe-wide comparable data available on poverty
for Greece has just become available for 2011 (though relying
on data from the previous year). The time lag means that the
poverty statistics relied on in this report only indicate impacts of
the earlier phases of the crisis. In 2012 the Greek government
has acknowledged that austerity measures combined with
wage and labour income reductions are likely to have had an
effect on poverty rates not yet shown by the statistics (Ministry
of Finance, Greece, 2012, p 30,31).
The combined ‘at risk of poverty or social exclusion’ indicator
used under the Europe 2020 strategy has risen markedly in
Greece from 27.6% in 2009 to 31% in 2011. In 2011 it
represented over 3.4 million people (Eurostat, 2012c.). The
European average rate is 23.4%.
The ‘at risk of poverty or social exclusion’ measure is a combined
one, which includes 3 separate measures of poverty. Rates for
each of the three measures are shown in Figure 2 and set out in
Appendix 3. In addition, Appendix 4 presents a graph showing
the rates for 2010 and 2011 (where available) across Europe.
Examining the three measures separately, gives a more detailed
picture of poverty in European countries since 2008. The at risk
of poverty measure is the one most commonly used in Europe.
As Figure 2 shows, Greece’s relatively high at risk of poverty
levels in the 2000s had shown a slight decline in 2009, but these
levels are increasing and show a sharp increase in 2011, pushing
the level to a rate higher than that for 2003. The at risk of
poverty indicator is a relative poverty measure, which means it
is related to an income threshold in each country, influenced by
the general level of income and its distribution in the population
(Social Protection Committee, 2011, p. 11). In Greece the increase
in poverty levels occurred notwithstanding the fact that the 60%
Poverty
risk of poverty threshold fell significantly between 2010 and 2011
in line with a fall in incomes generally15 (Eurostat, 2012h). See
Appendix 5 for the at risk of poverty thresholds, 2007-2011.
At 21.4% in 2011, Greece’s rate has increased substantially
since 2008 (from 19.7%). In 2010 (when availability of data
permits comparison), Greece had one of the highest at risk of
poverty rates in EU27 (Eurostat, 2012c). The EU27 average rate
was 16.4%. Greece’s rate was the sixth highest rate only
slightly exceeded by five other countries Lithuania, Bulgaria,
Spain, Romania and Latvia (Eurostat, 2012c). The 21.4% rate
for 2011 shows an increase of 1.3 percentage points in one
year; it represents over 2.3million people (Eurostat, 2012c).
As shown in Figure 2, between 2010 and 2011 there was also
a marked increase in the other two indicators of poverty –
people who were severely materially deprived and those who
were living in households with very low work intensity.
The severely materially deprived rate jumped from 11.6% in
2010 to 15.2% in 2011 representing a total of 1.6 million
people and an increase of 398,000 in one year (Eurostat,
2012c). The rate for people living in households with very low
work intensity went from 7.5% in 2010 to 11.8% in 2011, an
increase of 360,000 people (Eurostat, 2012c).
The EU SILC data allows analysis of the share of people who
are living below the 40% threshold – meaning the poorest
people whose incomes are less than 40% of the median
income. Overall, in EU27 the average rate has been increasing
slightly since 2008 with the average at 5.6% in 2010 (the
latest year for which Europe-wide data is available). In Greece
by contrast the increase has been marked between 2009 and
2011, going from 6.6% to 8.2% (Eurostat, 2012d). This suggests
that within the entire population living below the standard
poverty threshold there are signs of a deepening of poverty
levels amongst the poorest people.
Another indication of the depth of poverty is the relative
median at-risk-of-poverty gap, which helps to quantify just
how poor the poor are. The at risk of poverty gap has widened
in Greece by 2.7 percentage points between 2010 and 2011. In
2011 it stood at 26.1%, a rate exceeded only by Spain and four
Eastern European countries (Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria and
Lithuania) (Eurostat, 2012q).
In Greece, there has also been a striking increase between
2010 and 2011 in households reporting strain in maintaining
a basic standard of living. For example,
5 those unable to keep their homes adequately warm rose by
over 3 percentage points from 15.4% to 18.6%.( The rate in
2006 was 12%) (Eurostat, 2012r);
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SMD: Severely Materially Deprived
VLWI: Very Low Work Intensity (See Glossary for definitions)
15 The 60% at risk of poverty threshold is 60% of median equivalised incomes. The at risk of poverty threshold in Greece for a single person was €7,178 in 2010 and it fell to €6,591 in
2011. See Appendix 5
5 those unable to afford a meal with meat, chicken or fish (or
vegetarian equivalent) every second day increased from
7.9% in 2010 to 9.2% in 2011 (Eurostat, 2012s).
Children: Greece’s rate of child poverty has been high relative
to the EU27 average since at least 2005 (when comparable
data are available from Eurostat). At 23% in 2010 Greece has
a rate of poverty amongst children that is above the EU27
average (of 20.5%) and this was exceeded only by six other
countries - Spain, Italy, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania.
Childhood poverty rates had risen in Greece between 2004 and
2007 and have been at around 23% since then, but the rate for
2011 shows a slight increase to 23.7%% (Eurostat, 2012e).
Older People: The risk of poverty rate for those over 65 in Greece
was 21.3% in 2010, which was above the EU27 average rate of
16% (Eurostat, 2012f). It is also higher than the risk of poverty
rate for the working age population (19%) (The Social Protection
Committee, 2012, Table 5). Latest figures show a sizable increase
(more than two percentage points) in the poverty rate for this
age group between 2010 and 2011 – standing at 23.6%, a rate
which exceeds the rate it had been in 2007 (Eurostat, 2012e).
At 25.2% older women in Greece have a higher risk of poverty
rate than the rate for older men (21.7%) (Eurostat, 2012e).
Older women in Greece also have a higher rate of severe
material deprivation than older men, with a difference of
almost 5 percentage points in 2010 (The Social Protection
Committee, 2012, Table 11).
Working Poor: The rate of poverty in Greece for people who
are employed and who still do not earn enough to protect
them from poverty (the working poor) is 11.9% (2011). This is
one of the highest rates in Europe, exceeded only by Spain and
Romania in 2011 (of the countries for which data are available)
(Eurostat, 2012g). The OECD has identified this as a particular
problem facing Greece with part-time workers and those on
temporary contracts worst affected (OECD, n.d, p. 12).
Greece’s employment levels have been on a downward
trajectory since 2008 and the country has experienced the
worst drop in employment in Europe in the year to quarter 2,
2012. Unemployment is very high – just behind the rate for
Spain, which has the highest rate in Europe (See Appendix 7).
The youth unemployment rate is the highest in Europe and
exceeds 50% of young people (that is, under 25s). Long-term
unemployment rates are the highest in Europe and have
recently shown the highest rate of increase.
Income inequality has grown in Greece between 2010 and
2011. In 2011 the income share of the richest 20% of the
population was 6 times that of the poorest 20%. This had
increased from 5.6% in 2010 (EL. STAT, 2012, p. 51).
Some measures have been taken to address the shadow
economy16, but despite the length of time during which the
economic crisis has lasted and the successive rounds of
austerity measures, it is commonly understood that tax
evasion is still rife and that wealthy Greeks are under no more
pressure to pay taxes now than they were before (Spiegel
Online International, 2012).
The economic crisis and the austerity measures taken to
address it are impacting in Greece, a country with already high
levels of poverty, and there is a particularly marked worsening
of the position in the poverty rates that have recently become
available for 2011 (albeit with a 2010 reference period). The at
risk of poverty rate is one of the highest in Europe and all of
the indicators used to assess poverty levels (under the schema
Discussion: Impacts on Vulnerable Groups
laid down by the Europe 2020 Strategy) have shown marked
increases. Furthermore, there are signs of deepening poverty
levels amongst the poorest people.
The Greek government characterizes the problem of poverty
as high (as compared with the EU average), severe (the poor
are deeply poor) and persistent (the poor remain poor for
years) (Ministry of Finance, Greece, 2012). In the opinion of
social workers based with Caritas Athens, amongst those most
affected in the current climate are one-parent families with
small children. Indeed official statistics suggest that this type
of household had the highest at risk of poverty rate in 2011
(43.2%) (EL.Stat, 2012, p.45).
Greece’s child poverty rate is high in European terms and the
rate has begun to increase (between 2010 and 2011). Studies
of the distributional impact of austerity measures suggest that
they have not affected households with children in Greece as
much as they have in other countries such as Ireland, Portugal
and Spain (Sutherland & Matsaganis, 2011, p 3; Callan et al,
2011, p 17). However, those studies looked at the impact of
austerity measures only to 2010 in Greece (Callan et al, 2011, p
6), when it was clear that some of the measures introduced by
the Greek government (and listed above) had attempted to
cushion the effect on families with children in the early years of
the crisis. Of course, even if the effects of the crisis and the
measures introduced to address it had affected households with
children less than other households, this does not mean that
the poorest households with children did not suffer hardship.17
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16 For example, inspections regarding social contribution evasion have been increased and arrangements have been made for settling owed contributions aiming to counter avoidance
and fraud (The Social Protection Committee, 2012, p 46)
17 The studies concerned do not signify if the distribution is equitable or not (Callan et al, 2011 p 12, 13).
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Other measures such as the introduction of consumer taxes
will have disproportionately affected all lower income families.
It has been shown that the effect of large VAT increases in
Greece (4% increase in the standard rate) has been particularly
strong on households at the bottom of the income
distribution, particularly for the bottom two decile groups
(that is the bottom 20%) (Sutherland & Matsaganis, 2011, p.4,
Callan et al, 2011, p. 15, 17). Indeed, the Greek government
concedes that measures such as increases in VAT and duties on
fuel are regressive in nature and will have had an impact on
poverty (Ministry of Finance, 2012, p. 32).
Amongst the other types of people most affected, in the
observation of Caritas Athens, are disabled people and their
families, migrants, older people with health problems and
those on the minimum pension (Caritas Athens, 2012). One
issue, for example, is that pensioners who own property have
to meet the new property taxes which are assessed on asset
value rather than income; another is a requirement to pay in
advance for medicines and medical treatment, which is
reimbursed by Government, but reimbursement can take
months (Caritas, Athens, 2012).
A range of public policy measures (listed above) have affected the
income of pensioners. In Greece pensions have been cut across
all household income levels (Sutherland &Matsaganis, 2011, p 3).
A marked increase in poverty rates amongst older people is now
in evidence between 2010 and 2011, with older women at a
particular risk. Against that backdrop, the further severe pension
cuts passed in November 2012 must be of concern.
Migrant workers are always amongst the first to be hurt in an
economic crisis (Stiglitz, 2009). In Greece, the status of
immigrant workers who become unemployed changes to
illegal/undocumented after a few months (according to Caritas
Athens, 2012), which leaves them especially vulnerable.
Other particular problems that Caritas Athens identifies are that
many working households have lost a high percentage of their
income (through salary cuts, cuts in pensions, cuts in other
income sources) combined with a significant rise in taxation
and a significant rise in the cost of living since 2010. Structures
identified by Caritas Athens, which have a particular impact on
low-income families, include the fact that unemployment
benefits last only one year and that a range of subsidies that
helped low-income families have been cut or cancelled since
201018. They argue that a high proportion of Greeks are
struggling with daily expenses including food, water, electricity
and heating, and they observe that each time there are cuts and
more taxation, more companies and shops close down and even
more jobs are lost (Caritas, Athens, 2012).
Greece already has a very high rate of in-work poverty, which
would suggest the need for policy measures that strengthen
the incomes of low-earners. Instead the decision to reduce the
minimum wage seems likely to make their situation worse.
Because of their potential impact on people who are already
struggling, the cuts passed by the Parliament (7 November
2012) are of particular concern to Caritas Athens.
Finally, the impact of cuts to services (like health, social care
or education) cannot be assessed in a report of this nature.
However, it is inevitable that these cuts particularly affect
those with least income who do not have sufficient income to
compensate for them. Furthermore, many services in Greece are
traditionally provided by NGOs, but in many cases their funding
has been cut or withdrawn by the State19, and changes in
taxation policy have also made their operating environment
more difficult (Caritas, Athens, 2012).
Mrs. X is a 38 years old mother who came for help to Caritas through
the Social Services of the Athens Municipality, as this service does
not have the resources to help more people at the moment. She
is a housewife and cannot find work. She has two children. The
older child attends primary school, but the younger one was
rejected at a State day care centre due to long waiting lists. She
had married five years ago, her husband worked and rented a flat
in Athens. When the recession really hit Greece two years ago, he
lost his work and finally abandoned his family. When she was left
on her own with the children without a job and somebody to help
her look after them, she decided to move with her mother, who
had a pension of €480 per month. After seven months her mother
passed away and the family lost their income. When Mrs X came
to the Caritas Social Services she owed 8 months rent, water and
electricity bills. She has neither water nor electricity at home and
was at risk of being thrown out of her flat. While her mother was
alive, she at least had a home, electricity and water.
Caritas Athens
CASE STUDY
Mr. P. and his wife came for help to Caritas Social Services. They
are aged 83 and 81, respectively, and have a pension of €640 per
month. He worked on the island of Chios, but because of his
serious medical condition, they came to live in Athens when he
retired to be close to the hospital for his treatment. At Caritas
they receive food every month. They own a small house in Chios
but cannot move again there, as they fear he will not have good
CASE STUDY
medical treatment. They have an only son who is unemployed and
are desperate to help him.
Caritas Athens
18 Such as cancellation of a rental subsidy that was paid to families with private sector earnings of a maximum annual income less than €10,000, a mortgage subsidy for private sector
workers, subsidies for one-week holidays, cinema tickets and books for workers in deprived areas with incomes under €12,000 (one person) or €25,000 (family income, both working)
Caritas Athens, 2012
19 Caritas Athens gives as an example the case of disabled children in special schools who had received a State contribution for each child, which has ceased (Caritas, Athens, 2012)
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Following approximately a decade of export-led growth, from
2003 the Irish economy underwent a domestic boom based
on lax lending and property price inflation. Membership of the
EURO area gave banks access to wholesale funding that
‘turbocharged’ their asset expansion (IMF, 2012). In the five
years to mid-2008 the property bubble inflated bank assets to
some 500% of GDP (IMF, 2012). In this context it is important
to note that Irish Government borrowing was very low and
Ireland’s national debt was 24.8% of GDP when the crisis
began in 2007 (See Table 4 below). The borrowing that was
done was not done to fund Government expenditure but,
rather, to fund private ‘investment’ particularly in property
development. This borrowing was done by private banks, for
the most part.
Ireland’s property price decline started in 2007 and post-
Lehman Brothers financial turmoil tipped the vulnerable banks
into crisis. After facing losses on property assets, the banks
faced a run on wholesale funding, leading to massive recourse
to the Euro system liquidity fund (IMF, 2012). The Irish
Government issued a blanket guarantee from September 2008,
and transferred large-scale distressed commercial and
development properties to the (newly-established for this
purpose) National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) from
April 2009. The Government also provided large-scale support
for banks and had to borrow in order to do so. With a cost of
€64.1billion or some 40% of GDP, Ireland’s banking crisis is
considered the costliest in the world since at least the 1930s
after Iceland (IMF, 2012).
Background and Government Finances
There has been no burden sharing with the banks senior debt
holders because this was insisted on as the correct approach by
the European Central Bank to ensure pan-European fiscal
stability. In practice this has meant that the banks and
bondholders (among them some of Europe’s largest banks), who
gambled recklessly by investing in Ireland’s private banks and
saw their gambles fail, had their debts repaid in full by the Irish
taxpayer. While the decision to repay in full was taken by the
Irish Government, under pressure from the European Central
Bank and the European Commission, it was not approved by
the Irish people – a situation that has led to further questioning
of the democratic deficit that has been a marked characteristic
of decision-making in the EU for some time.
A steep decline in construction occurred in 2008 which was
worsened by contractions in world trade in 2009. Tax revenues,
which had been highly dependent on the construction/property
boom, collapsed, employment fell, unemployment rose and net
emigration returned. As Table 4 shows, the general Government
balance, which had been in surplus until 2007, dropped in 2008
to -7.4% of GDP and the situation has disimproved further
each year since then. The General Government gross debt was
one of the lowest in Europe in 2006 and 2007 but stood at
106.4% of GDP in 2011 which was more than a four-fold
increase in the rate from 2006. In 2011 Ireland’s rate was one
of the highest in Europe, exceeded only by the rates for Greece,
Italy and Portugal (Eurostat, 2012j). Total national debt at end
2011 was approximately €169billion, of which the proportion
used to rescue banks was 25% (€43bn) (which does not include
an additional €20billion from the National Pension Reserve
Fund also used to rescue banks) (Social Justice Ireland, 2012).
Ireland
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Government deficit/surplus, % GDP 1.4 1.7 2.9 0.1 -7.4 -13.9* -30.9* -13.4*
General Government Gross Debt % GDP 29.4 27.2 24.5 24.8 44.5 64.9 92.2 106.4
Source: Eurostat, 2012j,2012k, tsdde410; gov_dd_edpt1
* In 2010 especially, and also in 2009 and 2011, these rates include once-off measures (European Commission, 2012b) related to recapitalization of banks
IRELAND TABLE 4 Government Debt Rates
Successive cuts to most welfare rates once the crisis began
mean that most social welfare payments in Ireland
are below the poverty line.
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By late 2010 the Government lost access to market funding
and had to seek support from the ‘Troika’ consisting of the EU-
IMF-ECB. A package of €85billion was made available
including some bi-lateral loans (IMF, 2012). The EU/IMF
Programme of Financial Support, as well as the Stability and
Growth Pact, requires Ireland to cut the deficit between
Government spending and revenue to less than 3% of GDP by
2015. This will involve further adjustments of 3.9% of GDP
over two years of which one third is to be from revenue
measures, two thirds from cuts to expenditure (European
Commission, 2012b).20
Including current plans for Budget 2013 (in the Memorandum
of Understanding), the total increases in taxes and decreases
in public expenditure will mean that almost €28billion,
equivalent to 17% of GDP, will have been directly removed by
government from the economy (Social Justice Ireland, 2012).
In addition, the knock-on effect of these adjustments will have
removed additional economic activity from the economy. If
the current plans are implemented to 2015, the total
adjustment (2008-2015) will amount to €33 billion equivalent
to 18.5% of the GDP forecast for 2015 (Social Justice Ireland,
2012).
As Table 5 shows, Gross domestic product declined each year
between 2007 and 2009. In 2010 there was a return to modest
growth, which was led by growth in exports (which increased
5.1% year-on-year, while domestic consumption fell by 3.7%)
(IMF, 2012). The economy shrank again in the first quarter of
2012 (European Commission, 2012, p. 69). The most recent
forecasts from the European Commission are for weak growth
in 2012 and 2013 (see Table 5).
Ireland’s austerity budgets started in 2008 when the budget for
2009 was brought forward to October from its usual December
date. Numerous measures have continued to be implemented in
each year since. They include such measures as:
5 Jobseekers Assistance payment rates for unemployed people
(under 25) sharply reduced
5 Welfare rates were increased in the October 2008 Budget
but these were subsequently reduced a number of times for
those of working age
5 Reductions to universal Child Benefit
5 A cash benefit, the Early Childcare Supplement, abolished
(partially replaced by a new non-cash scheme of subsidisation
of places in early child care for children aged 3)
5 Cuts in wages of public servants
(Callan et al, 2011).
Revenue measures undertaken have included:
5 Changes to personal income tax (10% reduction in income
tax bands, introduction of universal social charge, elimination
of Pay-Related Social Insurance (PRSI) reliefs and exemptions),
5 Increase in indirect taxes (most notably, 2 percentage points
increase in VAT bringing the standard rate to 23% in 2012).
Policy Responses
The IMF (2012) lists the measures undertaken in Ireland 2009-
2012 as:
5 14% cut in public wages,
5 8% cut in welfare rates (except state pension),
5 17% cut in non-pay current budget,
5 63% cut in capital budget.
Like several other countries, Ireland’s measures to address the
unemployment problem include activation and training
initiatives, most recently Pathways to Work, Feb 2012 (IMF,
2012, p.24).
Austerity measures have involved more cuts in expenditure
than increases in taxes. The ratio between these has been 2:1
(IMF, 2012). Of major significance in this context is that flimsy
justification has been provided for this ratio. Insistence on it
has meant that Ireland’s already very-low total tax-take will
remain low despite the difficulties the country continues to
face21.
20 Where responsibility for this 1:2 ratio lies is a contested issue. Government has told the authors the Troika are insisting on it and the Troika has told the authors they will accept any
ratio as long as it produces the desired outcome where Government borrowing for the year is concerned.
21 Ireland’s total tax take in 2011 amounted to 30.8% of GDP, which is amongst the lowest in the EU (Social Justice Ireland, 2012). See also preceding footnote - number 20
Percentage change on previous year
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 (f) 2013 (f)
EU (27 countries) 3.3 3.2 0.3 -4.3 2.1 1.5 -0.3* 0.4*
Ireland 5.4 5.4 -2.1 -5.5 -0.8 1.4 0.4* 1.1*
Source: Eurostat, 2012, tec00115;
*European Commission, 2012b. - f: forecast - IMF forecast: for 2012: 0.4%; for 2013: 1.4% (IMF, 2012f, p. 66)
IRELAND TABLE 5 Real GDP growth rate - volume
Despite meeting the targets for expenditure cutting and
revenue raising set by the ‘Troika’ of the EU/ECB/IMF, Ireland
has yet to experience the benefits that were supposed to
follow, such as increased employment (see below).
Arrears in payments of mortgages are increasing with arrears
of 90 days in principal private residences doubling (to 14%)
between the end of 2010 and March 2012 (IMF, 2012).
In the Eurobarometer survey of the views of Europeans on the
social climate, Ireland’s ranking has decreased in every year
since the survey started (2009), and stands at -1.5 in 2012 in
fifteenth position (out of EU27) (European Commission, 2012,
p 43-46).
In 2011, the employment rate in Ireland was 64.1% as
compared with an EU27 average of 68.6% for people aged 20-
64. The employment level in Ireland (at Quarter 1, 2012), was
63.5% for people aged 20-64, compared with an EU27
average of 68%. Figure 2, below, shows the dramatic fall in
employment in Ireland since 2007, when it was above the
European average, to 2011 when it stood at 4.5 percentage
points below the average.
Employment/Unemployment
In 2011 Ireland’s unemployment rate was 14.4% (Eurostat,
2012i). At 15.1% (by September 2012), Ireland’s unemployment
rate was well above the European average (of 10.6%, EU27)
and is the fifth highest amongst EU27 countries (September,
2012)(Eurostat, 2012n). See Table 6 and Appendix 7.
Youth unemployment (15-24) figures are particularly high
(30.7%, July 2012) exceeded only by those for Greece,22 Spain,
Portugal, Italy, and Slovakia (European Commission, 2012, p 72).
At 9.6%, long-term unemployment has increased in the year
to Quarter 1, 2012 by 1.4 percentage points (European
Commission, 2012, p 73). The long-term unemployment rate
is now third highest in Europe behind Greece and Spain and
well above the EU(27) average (4.5%). The proportion of
unemployed people who were long-term unemployed in 2011
(that is, unemployed for 12 months or more) was nearly 60%–
the highest proportion in Europe (Eurostat, 2012i). This
situation would be much worse but for the fact that Ireland
has experienced net outward migration for three years23.
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22 Greek rate for June 12 (European Commission, 2012)
23 Emigration has increased hugely since 2008. In the year to April 2012, 87,100 people emigrated (figures still preliminary) (CSO, 2012a). The figure was 80,600 during the previous year
to April 2011, and was 67,200 to April 2010. Numbers of those emigrating have exceeded those immigrating each year since 2010.
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Source: Eurostat, 2012b, t2020_10
2011 2012
Unemployment – rate (%) 14.4% 15.1% (Sept)
Unemployment – number of people 304,000 312,000 (Sept)
Youth Unemployment Rate (15-24) 30.7% (July)
Long-term Unemployment Rate (unemployed for 12 months or more) 9.6% (Q1)
Share of unemployment that is long-term 59.4%
Source: Eurostat, 2012i; Eurostat, 2012n, European Commission, 2012, p 72
IRELAND TABLE 6 Unemployment-Headline Statistics
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As already mentioned, the comparable data available on
poverty for some European countries relates to 2010 (relying
on data from the previous year, 2009). This is so for Ireland;
therefore, the data indicates the impact of the early stages of
the crisis only.
The combined ‘at risk of poverty or social exclusion’ indicator
used under the Europe 2020 strategy has risen significantly in
Ireland from 23.7% in 2008 to 29.9% in 2010, representing
1.3 million people, and an increase of some 285,000 people in
the year (source, Eurostat, 2012c.). The 2010 rate is one of the
highest rates of poverty and social exclusion in Europe, much
higher than the European average (of 23.4%), equal to that
of Hungary and exceeded only by four Eastern European
countries – Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania (Eurostat,
2012c). Rates for each of the three measures that make up
the combined ‘at risk of poverty or social exclusion’ indicator
are shown in Figure 4 and are set out in Appendix 3.
As Figure 4 shows, within the combined measures, Ireland has
a high proportion of adults with very low work intensity –
meaning they are distanced from the labour market – and
there have been very significant increases in this measure
since 2008, something that is consistent with the rise in long-
term unemployment.
When the at risk of poverty measure is considered as shown by
Figure 4, Ireland had high levels in the early 2000s, but rates
fell in the last years of the decade. That position is changing
again with an increase in the at risk of poverty rate between
2009 and 2010 of over 1 percentage point – this was one of
the highest rates of increase in EU27, exceeded only by Spain
and Slovenia (The Social Protection Committee, 2012, Table 4,
p.112). The 2010 rate was 16.1% representing 716,000 people
and was similar to the EU27 average rate of 16.4% (Eurostat,
Poverty
2012c). This occurred notwithstanding the fact that the 60%
risk of poverty threshold fell between 2008 and 2010 in line
with a fall in incomes generally24 (Eurostat, 2012h).
When we examine the share of people who are living with less
than 40% of the median income there has been a marked
increase between 2009 and 2010, going from 3.3% to 4.8%
(Eurostat, 2012d, tessi126). This suggests that there are signs
of a deepening of poverty levels amongst the poorest people.
Ireland is highly dependent on social transfers (or welfare
payments) to keep people out of poverty. At 51%, Ireland,
jointly with Hungary, has the highest poverty rate in the EU27
before social transfers and pensions (CSO, 2012, p. 42). In
other words, this shows how dependent a large number of
people in Ireland, especially people over 65, are on welfare
payments to protect them from poverty.
Children: Having fallen during the 2000s to a rate of 18% in
2008, there have been significant increases in Ireland’s child
poverty rate since 2008. In 2010 the rate was 19.7% of
children (those under 18), a rate which is just under the EU27
average of 20.5% (Eurostat, 2012e). This has risen from 18%
in 2008 or by almost 2 percentage points.
Older People: In Ireland the risk of poverty rate for people over
65 has fallen since 2008 and was 10.6% in 2010 (Eurostat,
2012f). It is important to note, as the EU Social Protection
Committee argues generally in relation to pensions, that
apparent improvements relative to poverty should be seen in
relation to declines in the poverty thresholds rather than as
improvements in the economic situation of people aged 65+ in
real terms (2012, p 20). Neither does it prove that people have
enough to live on, and light has been shed on this issue by studies
published in Ireland since 2010. Having regard to the needs
(personal, psychological and social) of an older person living
alone in rural Ireland, the study found that a weekly income of
€349.09 was necessary (McMahon et al, 2010, updated for
2012). This would be considerably more than the weekly income
of someone living on the poverty line in Ireland25 and exceeds
considerably the amount of the State pension (contributory and
non-contributory). It is also important to note how dependent
Irish older people are on social welfare payments to protect them
from poverty. Without social welfare payments, around 90%
of over 65s would be living in poverty (CSO, 2010).
Working Poor: The rate of poverty in Ireland for people who
work and who still do not earn enough to protect them from
poverty (the working poor) is 7.6% (2010), which is just under
the EU27 average of 8.4% (Eurostat, 2012g). There has been
a considerable increase in the rate in Ireland since 2008, when
it was 6.5%.
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PAROP: People at risk of poverty, 60% threshold
SMD: Severely Materially Deprived
VLWI: Very Low Work Intensity (See Glossary for definitions)
24 The 60% at risk of poverty threshold is 60% of median equivalised incomes. The at risk of poverty threshold n Ireland for a single person was €13,797 in 2008. It fell to €11,929 in
2010. See Appendix 5
25 The 60% at risk of poverty threshold is 60% of median equivalised incomes, which was €11,929 in 2010. This amounts to €229 per week. See Appendix 5. This amount is above the
general rate of the non-contributory state pension (€219 per week) and almost equates to the contributory state pension (€230 per week).
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26 In Greece, Spain and Portugal the percentage reduction in disposable income was between 2-3% but in all cases the researchers note that more austerity measures were being
planned in all the countries they reviewed – remember too that this research was published in 2011.
27 Ireland had a General Election in March 2011 and a change of Government followed.
Research undertaken on the impact of austerity measures
across income groups (to 2011) in a number of European
countries (including Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal and
also the UK and Estonia) found that the size of the adjustment
undertaken in Ireland was substantially greater than in the
other countries representing approximately 8% of disposable
income26 (Callan et al, 2012, p. 53; Callan et al 2011, p 11).
Overall, the measures introduced between 2009 and 2011 in
Ireland are described as progressive with, for example, the cuts
to public sector pay affecting people with higher incomes more
than those in the bottom deciles (Callan et al, 2012). The term
‘progressive’ means that better-off households pay a larger
share, although this is not surprising as better-off households
have a disproportionate share of total income – they also have
a greater ability to pay, so this does not signify if the distribution
is related to ability of groups to pay or, in other words, whether
it is equitable or not (Callan et al, 2011, p 12. 13).
The situation worsened for those in the bottom income groups
in 2012. Measures implemented as part of Budget 2012 by
Ireland’s new government27 (since the cross-country study
discussed above was completed) have been found to affect the
poorest more than the richest. In 2012, the poorest 40% of
households were predicted to see a fall of between 2-2.5% in
their incomes; the richest 30% to lose only 0.7% of theirs as a
result of Government’s decisions in Budget 2012 (Callan et al,
2012). The measures involved were indirect tax increases (VAT
and carbon levy) and selective reductions in welfare payments.
It is notable that along with Cyprus, Ireland is the only
European country where within the last year the greatest
impact of financial distress in households has been seen in the
lower income quartiles rather than the upper quartile
(European Commission, 2012, p.29).
Discussion: Impacts on Vulnerable Groups
Relative to future measures, the IMF has conceded that no
‘low-hanging fruit’ is left and has suggested that expenditure
reductions become progressively more difficult in the later
phases of consolidation or when key services begin to be
affected (IMF, 2012, p. 22).
Successive cuts to most welfare rates once the crisis began
mean that most social welfare payments in Ireland are below
the poverty line, with the weekly social assistance payment
for a single adult being €19.94 below the poverty line (Social
Justice Ireland, 2012; Healy et al, 2012) and this is so even
though the poverty threshold is decreasing (See Appendix 5).
In Ireland account must be taken of this before any further
expenditure cuts are contemplated. The effect of Budget 2012
measures in relation to the highly negative impact of indirect
taxes on lower-income groups should also be factored into
these decision-making processes.
Cuts have already been made in health and education services,
and severe cuts in essential home care supports to older
people have been announced (Autumn, 2012). However, while
the impact of cuts to services (like health, social care or
education) cannot be assessed in a report of this nature, these
cuts inevitably particularly affect those who do not have
sufficient income to compensate for them.
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In the late 1980s and early 1990s Italy had strong economic
growth and strong performance in exports. However, growth
eventually stagnated, and between 2001 and 2008 average
growth was only 0.8% of GDP (Menendez, 2012).
For many years in the 2000s Italy’s debt was the highest in
Europe. In more recent years, debt levels in Greece have
overtaken Italy at the top of the league, but Italy’s debt levels
remain second only to Greece. By 2011 the ratio of government
debt to GDP was 120.7%. Table 7, below, shows the increase
in both the government deficit and the government gross debt
(as a percentage of GDP) between 2004 and 2011. See also
Appendix 1.
Latest figures from Eurostat relating to quarter 2, 2012,
suggest that the ratio of government gross debt has continued
to increase and is now 126.1% of GDP, second only to Greece
and followed by Portugal and Ireland (Eurostat, 2012L).
Large public debt and low growth left Italy vulnerable to the
economic crisis of 2008 and to the subsequent crisis in the
Euro zone. Italy came under intense financial pressures in
2011 as Government bond yields went above 7%. It was urged
several times by the Institutions of the European Union to
address structural weaknesses considered to be causing its
very low growth rates. However, like Spain, Italy is considered
‘too big to fail.’
Background and Government Finances
Some measures to address the crisis were introduced under
the government of Silvio Berlusconi, and the new Government
(under Mario Monti) introduced a large range of measures
including fiscal consolidation, plans to liberalise services and
to introduce labour reforms (IMF, 2012e).
The IMF regularly monitors and advises Italy on possible
economic risks and on consequent policy adjustments as part
of its surveillance role (as it does with its other members) (IMF,
2012b). Italy is not, of course, a ‘programme’ country in the
sense of having requested assistance in the way that Greece,
Ireland and Portugal have. According to the IMF’s latest report
on Italy, successive rounds of austerity measures have
impacted on employment and growth (IMF, 2012e, Staff
Statement, p.1). The IMF still considers Italy vulnerable to an
intensification of the Euro area crisis (IMF, 2012e).
As Table 8, below, shows, Italy’s economy contracted from
2006 and returned to modest growth in 2010. However, most
recently, GDP has contracted for a fourth consecutive quarter
at the end of quarter 2, 2012 (European Commission, 2012,
Table 6, p.69). The European Commission has recently reduced
its forecasts for 2012 and 2013.
Italy
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Government deficit/surplus, % GDP -3.5 -4.4 -3.4 -1.6 -2.7 -5.4 -4.5 -3.9
General Government Gross Debt % GDP 103.4 105.7 106.3 103.3 106.1 116.4 119.2 120.7
Source: Eurostat, 2012j,2012k, tsdde410; gov_dd_edpt1
ITALY TABLE 7 Government Debt Rates
Percentage change on previous year
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 (f) 2013 (f)
EU (27 countries) 3.3 3.2 0.3 -4.3 2.1 1.5 -0.3* 0.4*
Italy 2.2 1.7 -1.2 -5.5 1.8 0.4 -2.3* -0.5*
Source: Eurostat, 2012, tec00115;
*European Commission, 2012b - f: forecast - IMF forecast: for 2012: -2.3 %; for 2013: -0.7% (IMF, 2012f, p. 66)
ITALY TABLE 8 Real GDP growth rate - volume
On the social climate, Italy has seen the single largest
decline of any of the 27 Member States from 2011 to 2012.
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A number of modifications to the tax and benefits system were
introduced by the Berlusconi government in 2008 before the
impact of the crisis was felt. They intended to cushion the
effects of the crisis on poor families. These included a ‘social
card’, a ‘family bonus’, a power (electricity) bonus, gas bonus
and relief from property tax on residences. Such measures were
intended to address the type of welfare system operating, which
has been characterized as a relatively ‘weak’ Mediterranean
model which relies a great deal on family supports.28 The
measures have been extended and maintained during the crisis,
although without, in the opinion of Caritas Italy, being modified
sufficiently in light of the circumstances to make them effective.
In addition, extensions were made to the Wage Guarantee Fund
(Caritas Italiana, 2012a). This latter measure along with
unemployment benefit are considered by Caritas Italy to have
made the greatest contribution to protecting people from
poverty, although to have been of limited value to workers on
atypical contracts (who are often young people and more casual
workers) (Caritas Italiana, 2012a).
Over the past 3-4 years, new tax-deduction measures have
followed for certain types of families (for example, those with
children under 3, families paying mortgages). However, Caritas
Italy points out that there is a gap in respect of ‘famiglie
incapienti,’ - those who have insufficient income to declare taxes
to whom the measures do not apply (Caritas Italiana, 2012c).
A number of large-scale cuts over the period 2009-2012 were
also proposed to funds available for social policies (including
policies for young people, families, housing, children and
adolescents) under the Berlusconi government and other
programmes were cancelled (including programmes for inclusion
of immigrants and childcare services) (Caritas Italiana, 2012a).
Policy Responses
A series of austerity packages were introduced in 2011 (July and
September), and in October 2011 at a crisis summit of EU leaders,
significant additional measures were required (Thomsen-Fasano,
2012). The new Government introduced a range of measures
(associated with the ‘Save Italy’ decree, Dec 2011). These included:
5 Changes to pensions such as progressive raising of the pension
age aiming for longer term sustainability,
5 A shift from direct to indirect taxes,
5 Higher taxation on wealthy, especially on property and
measures to counter tax evasion,
5 Increased VAT and excise taxes on fuels,
5 Wage cuts for senior civil servants (by 10%), wage freeze for
other public servants since 2010
5 ‘streamlining’ costs in healthcare and education
(IMF, 2012e, p. 20, 21, Staff Statement, p.1,2, Ministero Dell
Economia E Delle Finanze, Italy, 2012, p. 42-47).
Roughly two-thirds of the measures relied on raising revenue,
while one third relied on expenditure cuts (IMF, 2012e).
The Italian government has approved changes in labour market
policy intended to promote growth in the economy. The
measures provide for an easing of licensing systems in some
professions designed to make them more open, measures to
make it easier to dismiss employees and also, in an effort to
balance those measures, the introduction of universal
unemployment insurance (European Commission, 2012, p. 64;
IMF, 2012e, Staff Statement, p. 3).
Caritas Italy has welcomed measures recently approved relative
to exchange transactions intended to dissuade financial
speculation, and wishes to see those measures strengthened
and extended (Caritas Italiana, 2012c).
In 2011, the employment rate in Italy was 61.2% as compared
with an EU27 average of 68.6% for people aged 20-64. Figure
5, below, shows how employment fell from 2008, with a slight
improvement in 2011. However, in the first quarter of 2012 it fell
again and stands at 60.7%, as compared with an EU27 average
of 68% (European Commission, 2012, Table 11, p. 71).
Employment/Unemployment
28 See discussion above under the heading ‘Welfare Systems’. The Mediterranean model can be classified as weak in terms of its performance by comparison with the standard of typical
Scandinavian or Continental European countries as it, amongst other things, relies on the role of the family as a social security cushion and informal networks (Ponzini and Pugliese,
cited in Caritas Italiana, 2012b). The usefulness of these measures (that is, those such as the ‘Social card’, ‘Family bonus’ and ‘power bonus’) in addressing poverty in any
comprehensive way is also questioned by Caritas Italy
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Source: Eurostat, 2012b, t2020_10
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The employment rate varies strongly between regions, ranging
from 65.1% in the north (Settentrione) to 44.2% in the south
(Mezzogiorno) (2nd quarter 2012) (European Commission,
2012, p. 63).
Another feature of the employment situation in Italy is the large
number of part-time jobs. In the past year (to July 2012) there
was a further loss of full-time jobs (down 2.3% or 439,000 full-
time jobs) and an increase in part-time jobs (+10.9% or 391,000
part-time jobs). The share of part-time jobs of all jobs therefore
rose to 17.3% (European Commission, 2012, p. 63).
The unemployment rate was 8.4% in 2011 representing
2.1million people (Eurostat, 2012i). The rate is worsening and
has gone from a rate which was below the EU27 average in
July, 2011 to a rate of 10.8% in September 2012 – just above
the average of 10.6% (Eurostat, 2012n). See Appendix 7. In
numerical terms, the annual increase (to July 2012)
represented 726,000 more unemployed people resulting in a
total of 2.7million unemployed people (quarter 2, 2012)
(European Commission, 2012, p.63). See Table 9.
The European Commission has noted that the rate of increase
in unemployment in the south (Mezzogiorno) is particularly
worrying in the past year, having risen from 13.1% to 17.1%,
and that the rise is especially notable among men in that
region (from 11% to 16%) (European Commission, 2012, p.63).
Amongst non-Italians the unemployment rate rose from
10.9% to 13.6% (in the year to July 2012) (European
Commission, 2012, p. 63).
Youth unemployment (age 15-24) is particularly marked in
Italy. The youth unemployment rate is 35.3%, and amongst
European countries is exceeded only by Spain, Portugal and
Greece (July 201229) (European Commission, 2012, p 72). While
the average unemployment rate increased by 2.5 percentage
points between July 2011 and July 2012, the rate of increase
in youth unemployment was 7.5 percentage points, the
highest rate of increase in the EU of the 19 countries for which
data is available EU (to July 2012) (European Commission,
2012, p 72).
A growing number of young people have moved to Germany
or outside the EU to work (European Commission, 2012, p. 63).
Italy’s long-term unemployment rate is also increasing,
standing at 5.3% (Quarter 1, 2012) and above the EU27
average (4.5%). More than half (53.1%) of those who are
unemployed are long-term unemployed (that is, unemployed
for more than 12 months) (2nd quarter, 2012) (European
Commission, 2012, p 63).
2011 2012
Unemployment – rate (%) 8.4% 10.8% (Sept)
Unemployment – number of people 2.1million 2.7million (Q2)
Youth Unemployment Rate (15-24) 35.3% (July)
Long-term Unemployment Rate (unemployed for 12 months or more) 5.3% (Q1)
Share of unemployment that is long-term 51.9% 53.1% (Q2)
Source: Eurostat, 2012i; Eurostat, 2012n, European Commission, 2012, p. 63, 72
ITALY TABLE 9 Unemployment-Headline Statistics
The comparable data available on poverty for Italy relates to
2010 (relying on data from the previous year, 2009), indicating
the impact only of the early stages of the crisis.
The Italian rate under the combined ‘at risk of poverty or social
exclusion’ indicator used throughout Europe (for the purposes
of assessing progress toward the targets of the Europe 2020
Strategy) was 24.5% in 2010 representing some 14.7million
people, a rate which exceeds the EU27 average of 23.4%
(Eurostat, 2012c). Rates for each of the three measures that
make up the combined ‘at risk of poverty or social exclusion’
indicator are set out in Appendix 3 and indicated below in
Figure 6.
Poverty
29 The rate for Greece (of 55.4%) relates to June 2012 as data from Greece for July 2012 is not available
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Source: Eurostat, 2012c, t2020,51,52,53
PAROP: People at risk of poverty, 60% threshold
SMD: Severely Materially Deprived
VLWI: Very Low Work Intensity (See Glossary for definitions)
The rate of relative income poverty or ‘at risk of poverty rate’
in Italy was 18.2% in 2010, which is a slight fall on the 2010
level (18.4%) but above the EU27 average rate of 16.4%. This
represents 10.9 million people (Eurostat, 2012c). Italy stood in
21st place with a level very similar to Portugal and exceeded
by only six countries (Greece, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Spain,
Romania and Latvia). See Appendix 4. It might be asked why
the risk of poverty rate did not increase, given the fall in
employment and expenditure cuts, but there is a time lag in
the availability of data, meaning that these poverty rates
relate only to the early years of the economic crisis in Europe.
As Figure 6 shows, one of the indicators within the three
indicators of poverty increased between 2009 and 2010 - that
for people living in households with very low work intensity.
This rate went from 8.8% in 2009 (which was just below the
EU27 average) to 10.2% in 2010, which is just above the EU27
average, and represents an increase of 592,000 in one year
(Eurostat, 2012c). This is a worrying trend, as it signals a
danger of long term exclusion from the labour market
something that is also reflected in the high rate of long-term
employment amongst those who are unemployed (as discussed
above).
Furthermore, the indicator for severe material deprivation is
also at a higher level in 2010 (6.9%) than it was in 2006
(6.3%) having climbed, in between times, to 7.5% in 2008
(Eurostat, 2012c, see Appendix 3). The increase in numerical
terms represents an increase of some 477,000 people between
2006 and 2010, totaling 4.1million in 2010 (Eurostat, 2012c).
Child Poverty: Italy’s rate of child poverty has been high
relative to the EU27 average since at least 2005 (when
comparable data are available from Eurostat). In 2010 the rate
was 24.7% and there had been a slight increase between 2009
and 2010. This rate was above the EU27 average of 20.5%
(Eurostat, 2012e), exceeded only by Spain, Bulgaria, Latvia and
Romania.
Older People: The risk of poverty rate for people aged 65+ in
Italy is 16.6% - similar to the EU27 average rate (16%) for
2010 (Eurostat, 2012f), and similar to the rate for the working
age population (16.9%) (The Social Protection Committee,
2012, Table 5). The rate has fallen in recent years. However,
the rate is considerably higher for older women in Italy
(19.5%) than older men (12.6%) in 2010 – a gap of nearly 7
percentage points (Eurostat, 2012f).
Working Poor: The rate of poverty in Italy for people who
work and who still do not earn enough to protect them from
poverty (the working poor) is 9.4% (2010), which is above the
EU27 average of 8.4% (Eurostat, 2012g). The rate has shown
considerable variation since 2006 and is slightly lower in 2010
than in was in 2009.
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30 In fact it shows a slight decrease between 2009 and 2010
31 This is based on the collection of data from a representative sample of 195 Centres located in 15 regions.
Italy already had a high rate of income poverty relative to the
EU27 average before 2008. (See Appendix 3). As has already
been said, the time lag in availability of comparable data
means that the poverty rates examined in this report capture
only the early stages of the economic crisis. While the rate of
relative income poverty (the at risk of poverty rate) does not
yet show an increase,30 some deteriorations are identifiable
within the recognised indicators for poverty, such as the
increase in people living in households that are distanced from
the labour market (that is, people in households where no one
is working or working much) between 2009 and 2010, and the
rise in severe material deprivation between 2006 and 2010.
The rate for child poverty is above the European average and
has shown a slight increase. The rate of poverty of older
women must be of particular concern.
The fall in employment since 2008 has meant that there has
been a sharp rise in unemployment (particularly marked in the
south within the past year), as well as an increase in part-time
Discussion: Impacts on Vulnerable Groups
jobs as a proportion of all jobs. Unemployment amongst young
people (aged 15-24) is a particular problem and the rate of
increase in youth unemployment is the highest rate of increase
in the EU in the year to July 2012 (of the countries for which
data is available). Long-term unemployment is increasing and
over half of those who are unemployed are now in this
category.
On the ground there is evidence of a rise in those seeking help
for income and social problems since 2007. Caritas Italy has
been able to identify a large increase in those seeking help
from the approximately 3,000 ‘Centri di Ascolta’ (or
Counselling Centres) located throughout Italy, which deal with
people experiencing a wide range of social problems. Since
2007 there has been an increase in the numbers seeking help
in each year to 2011. In 2008 this increase was 8.5% over the
previous year. In 2011, there was a marked rise in requests for
help, representing 54.1% more people seeking help than had
done so in 200731 (Caritas Italiana, 2012c). Similarly, there has
been a large increase (70.7%) between 2010 and 2012
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amongst the projects delivered by local churches and Caritas
Italy to address poverty and exclusion32 (Caritas Italiana,
2012c).
There is also some independent evidence of a rise in distress
amongst Italian households during 2011 and 2012, in
particular. The European-wide consumer surveys (carried out
under the joint harmonised EU programme of business and
consumer surveys) show how many households are facing
financial difficulties, such as running into debt to cover
current expenses. Amongst European countries, there are some
interesting points to note about the situation of Italy over the
past year (to July 2012):
5 Italy is the country in which consumer opinion has declined
most sharply, and
5 Amongst households in the lower income quartile (that is, the
lowest 25%), Italy is the country in which financial distress
has risen most sharply, showing a rise of 10 percentage points
(European Commission, 2012, p 30).
In the Eurobarometer survey of the views of Europeans on the
social climate, Italy has seen the single largest decline of any
of the 27 Member States from 2011 to 2012, from -1.1 to -3.1.
Its ranking has declined from thirteenth in 2011 to twenty-
third in 2012 (out of EU27) (European Commission, 2012, p
43-46).
Finally, it may be worth noting that the impact of cuts to
services (like health, social care or education) cannot be
assessed in a report of this nature. However, these cuts are
most likely to particularly affect those who do not have
sufficient income to compensate for them. Measures taken to
cut education budgets in Italy should take account of the high
rate of early school leaving33 that already exists (18.2% in
2011, which is above the EU27 average rate of 13.5%), which
if worsened will have both personal effects on the life chances
of those involved as well, ultimately, on the economy. The low
rates of attainment of tertiary education34 (20.3% in Italy as
opposed to an EU27 average rate of 34.5% in 2011) also need
to be borne in mind (Eurostat, 2012m).
32 Such as microloans, grants, information provision on employment and housing, and innovative projects aimed especially at supporting families
33 Early leavers from education and training refers to the % of the population aged 18-24 with at most lower secondary education and not in further education or training (Eurostat, 2012m)
34 Tertiary education attainment levels are assessed as the share of the population aged 30-34 years who have successfully completed university or university-like (tertiary-level)
education (Eurostat, 2012m)
Caritas Italy programmes are responding to new types of poverty
that they identify as emerging, such as:
5 Adults aged 40-50 years who find themselves unemployed
after a lifetime of regular work,
5 Young adults whose work consists of temporary contracts,
which means that they are constantly having to seek new work
and are prevented from planning for the future,
5 Entrepreneurs with debt trouble and facing bankruptcy,
5 Immigrants who had formerly been beneficiaries who (some 4-
5 years later) have to seek help again having lost their jobs or
having to seek work in the grey economy
5 Older people trying to help children and sometimes grandchildren,
sometimes by entering into arrangements where they sell their
houses retaining only a right of residence until death (Caritas
Italiana, 2012c)
Caritas Italy
PROFILE
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35 The Portuguese Authorities have noted, however, that rising unemployment and growth in exports is less favourable to tax revenues (IMF, 2012a, Letter of Intent, June 27, 2012 p49)
Since joining the Euro in 1999, Portugal has had the lowest
growth in the Eurozone and suffered from low productivity
and competitiveness. Between 2001 and 2007 Portugal
experienced only 1.1% average annual growth (Menendez,
2012). The government deficit was -6.5% of GDP in 2005 and
it was -3.1% in 2007 (see Table 10). When the global financial
crisis occurred, a drop in tax revenues led to further increases
in the government deficit and in general gross debt. At 108.1%
in 2011, Portugal had the third highest general government
gross debt to GDP ratio in Europe (EU27), behind only Greece
and Italy (Eurostat, 2012j).
As debt continued to grow investors were unwilling to lend
and in May 2011 Portugal was the third country to seek a
‘bailout’ from the EU-ECB-IMF troika. The programme review
one year later was published by the IMF in July 2012 (IMF,
2012a). The objective agreed was to reduce the Government
deficit to 4.5% of GDP by 2012 and to 3% of GDP by 2013
(IMF, 2012a, p. 12, 21). More recently agreement has been
reached in light, inter alia, of the ‘considerable sacrifice being
made by the Portuguese people’ to change the target for 2013
to 4.5% (IMF, 2012d). Amongst the July objectives set for the
programme the following is outlined:
Background and Government Finances
‘..maintain ﬁscal consolidation over the
medium term up to a balanced budgetary
position, notably by containing expenditure
growth. This consolidation will be achieved
by means of high-quality permanent measures
minimizing the impact of consolidation on
vulnerable groups’
(IMF, 2012a, MOU, p 4 – emphasis added)
Additional consolidation measures of about 3% of GDP are to
be adopted in 2013 to meet the 4.5% of GDP deficit target
(European Commission, 2012b, p 98).
As Table 11 shows, the Portuguese economy shrank between
2007 and 2010, and again in 2011 and is likely to continue to
be in negative figures in 2012. Domestic demand in particular
is shrinking but this is balanced somewhat by the export
performance35 (IMF, 2012a, Table 1, p 26). Most recently the
economy shrank again in quarter 2, 2012, which was the fifth
consecutive quarter showing a decline (European Commission,
2012, p. 9, 69). The Autumn projections for 2012 from the
European Commission are more pessimistic than the Spring
forecasts due, in the Commission’s opinion, to the dampening
of domestic demand by consolidation measures and a decline
in external demand (2012b, p 97).
Portugal
‘The most vulnerable social groups have been hit hardest by the ﬁscal austerity measures
implemented in Portugal. The government should strengthen its efforts to mitigate the
negative impact of the ﬁnancial crisis, in particular on children, elderly and the Roma,’
Commissioner Muižnieks, Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Government deficit/surplus, % GDP -4.0 -6.5 -4.6 -3.1 -3.6 -10.2 -9.8 -4.4
General Government Gross Debt % GDP 61.9 67.7 69.4 68.4 71.7 83.2 93.5 108.1
Source: Eurostat, 2012j,2012k, tsdde410; gov_dd_edpt1
PORTUGAL TABLE 10 Government Debt Rates
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Percentage change on previous year
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 (f) 2013 (f)
EU (27 countries) 3.3 3.2 0.3 -4.3 2.1 1.5 -0.3* 0.4*
Portugal 1.4 2.4 0 -2.9 1.4 -1.7 -3.0* -1.0*
Source: Eurostat, 2012, tec00115.
* European Commission, 2012b - f: forecast - IMF forecast: for 2012: -3.0 %; for 2013: -1.0% (IMF, 2012f, p. 66)
PORTUGAL TABLE 11 Real GDP growth rate - volume
Measures introduced since 2009 include:
5 freezing of nearly all insurance benefits and pensions
5 reducing the pensions tax allowance,
5 reduction in means-tested unemployment assistance, family
benefit and social assistance,
5 increase in standard VAT rate (from 20% to 23%) including
increasing the VAT on natural gas and electricity to standard
rate (Oct 2011),
5 increase in income tax rates, introduction of additional tax
rate for top earners (above €153,300 per year), and
reductions of tax credits,
5 public sector pay cuts (up to 10%),
5 reductions in numbers of employees in central Government
and across public administration generally.
(Callan et al, 2011, p 9, 34; IMF, 2012a, p 46; IMF, 2012a, MOU,
p. 7)
Active labour-market policies have been pursued including:
5 a programme targeting young people involving internships
and a reimbursement of social security contributions
(Impulso Jovem), and
5 incentives for employers and a wage subsidy to employers
who hire and train people who have been unemployed for
6 months or more (called Estimulo 2012) (IMF, 2012a, p 52).
There have been privatizations of energy companies (EDP and
REN) and more are proposed (including the airline TAP, the
airport infrastructure ANA, the postal service CTT and the
water supply Aguas de Portugal ) (IMF, 2012a, p. 13).
As a response to the social crisis faced, a programme was
introduced in October 2011 called the Social Emergency
Programme (PES), which is a four year plan intended to ‘focus
on simple and direct measures to lessen the social impact of
the crisis’ (Government of Portugal, 2012, p. 7).
According to theMemorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the
Troika of June 2012, a long list of commitments is made in order
to reach the deficit reduction planned for 2012 (IMF, 2012a).
Policy Responses
Amongst the measures proposed for 2012/13 are:
5 reductions in pensions (with different approaches to
different levels: including cuts for those with pensions of
between €600-€1,000 per month, and freezing of pensions
below €600 per month, with potential marginal increases
for those on the lowest levels),
5 controlling costs in the health sector,
5 reductions in costs in education by €380m,
5 reductions in social transfers (other than pensions) of at
least €180m by tightening eligibility criteria and decreasing
some benefits,
5 increasing personal income tax,
5 reductions in numbers and in wages of government
employees.
(IMF, 2012a, MOU, p. 5, 7)
However, since July the Government has been experiencing
intensive resistance to these and to further measures. For
example, the constitutional court rejected the plan to cut civil
servants' benefits, and a plan to raise social security payments
was abandoned after street protests. Budget 2013 measures
were passed by Parliament at the end of October but this is
being resisted by street protests and challenges in the
constitutional courts on grounds that the tax increases weigh
too heavily on the poor (Reuters, 2012). There were violent
clashes after the general strike that took place in November
(to coincide with the one in Spain).
There has been a sizeable increase in Portuguese people reporting
that they are in arrears with payments (mortgage/rent/utility
bills/hire-purchase) between 2010 and 2011. In 2010 the rate
was 8.6% of the population, which grew to 10.2% (that is more
than one in every ten people) in 2011 (Eurostat, 2012t). In 2008
the rate had been 6.5%.
In the Eurobarometer survey of the views of Europeans on the
social climate, Portugal’s ranking has decreased in every year
since the survey started (2009), and stands at -3.2 in 2012 in
twenty-fourth position (out of EU27) (followed by Hungary,
Romania and Greece) (European Commission, 2012, p 43-46).
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Employment levels in Portugal have fallen markedly since
2008, as Figure 7, below, shows, but were still marginally
higher than the EU27 average in 2011 (69.1% in Portugal;
68.6% average, age group 20-64). However, the latest
indications are that the employment rate in quarter 1, 2012,
was 67% for people aged 20-64, compared with an EU27
average of 68%. Portugal’s employment rate declined
markedly (-4.2%) in the year to quarter 2, 2012 representing
205,000 people. Its decline was exceeded only by Greece (-
9%) (European Commission, 2012, p 13, 69).
Employment/Unemployment
At 12.9% at the end of 2011, the unemployment rate in
Portugal represented 706,000 people and was above the
European average of 9.6% (Eurostat, 2012i). By September
2012 the rate had increased markedly to 15.7% (855,000
people), well above the European average of 10.6%, EU27
(Eurostat, 2012n). In September Portugal had the fourth highest
rate in Europe – behind, Spain, Greece and Latvia, and closely
followed by Ireland (Eurostat, 2012n). See Table 12, below, and
Appendix 7.
At a rate of 36.4% youth unemployment (age 15-24) is very
high, and has grown at a rate of 7 percentage points in the
year to July 2012, a rate of growth exceeded only marginally by
Italy (European Commission, 2012, p 72) .
Portugal’s long-term unemployment rate is also increasing,
standing at 6.9% (Quarter 1, 2012) and well above the EU27
average (4.5%). The proportion of those amongst the
unemployed who were long-term unemployed (without work
for 12 months or more) at the end of 2011 was nearly 50%
(48.2%) (Eurostat, 2012i).
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Source: Eurostat, 2012b, t2020_10
2011 2012
Unemployment – rate (%) 12.9% 15.7% (Sept)
Unemployment – number of people 706,000 855,000 (Sept)
Youth Unemployment Rate (15-24) 36.4% (July)
Long-term Unemployment Rate (unemployed for 12 months or more) 6.9% (Q1)
Share of unemployment that is long-term 48.2%
Source: Eurostat, 2012i; Eurostat, 2012n, European Commission, 2012, p 72
PORTUGAL TABLE 12 Unemployment-Headline Statistics
As already mentioned there is a time-lag in the availability of
data on comparable poverty measures across Europe. Figures
are now published for Portugal for 2011 (with a 2010 reference
period), but this still represents the relatively early stages of
the impact of the crisis. It also relates to the period before
Portugal entered the IMF/EU assistance programme. The
discussion of poverty indicators included in this section must
be considered with those limitations in mind.
Poverty
Portugal has a high rate of ‘poverty and social exclusion’,
which is the combined indicator used under the Europe 2020
strategy. The rate rose in Portugal between 2009 and 2010 but
shows a slight fall to a rate of 24.4% in 2011 (similar to the
2009 level). This represents 2.6 million people (source,
Eurostat, 2012c.). Portugal’s rate is higher than the EU27
average rate of 23.4% (2010) (Eurostat, 2012c).
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The most commonly used indicator of poverty in Europe is the
at risk of poverty rate – which is a relative poverty indicator
linked to 60% of median incomes. Having fallen between 2004
and 2009, the Portuguese at risk of poverty rate was 17.9% in
2009 and 2010 and rose to 18% in 2011, which represents (in
2011) over 1.9million people (Eurostat, 2012c). This increase
happened notwithstanding the fact that the risk of poverty
threshold fell (between 2010 and 2011) in line with a fall in
incomes generally36 (Eurostat, 2012h).
Portugal’s at risk of poverty rate is higher than the EU27
average (of 16.4%). At 2010 levels, when availability of data
makes it possible to make a comparison with other countries,
Portugal’s ranking was 20th, exceeded by only 7 other
countries: Italy, Greece, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Spain, Romania
and Latvia (Eurostat, 2012c). See Appendix 4.
As Figure 8 shows, the indicator for people in households with
very low work intensity rose by 1.7 percentage points between
2009 and 2010, but in 2011 it fell marginally (to 8.2%).There
has also been a slight reduction in the indicator for severe
material deprivation between 2010 and 2011 (Eurostat, 2012c).
Rates for each of the three measures that make up the
combined ‘at risk of poverty or social exclusion’ indicator are
set out in Appendix 3.
Child Poverty: Portugal’s rate of child poverty has been above
the EU27 average rate since at least 2005 (when comparable
data are available from Eurostat). Portugal’s child poverty rate
fell between 2004 and 2007, but there was a sizable increase
between 2007 and 2008 and the rate has remained at about
that level since. The 2010 rate is above the EU27 average: the
average rate was 20.5%, while Portugal’s rate was 22.4%
(2010 and 2011) (Eurostat, 2012e).
Older People: The risk of poverty rate for people aged 65+ in
Portugal was 21% in 2010 and latest figures suggest a rate of
20% for 2011, which is similar to the rate for 2009 (Eurostat,
2012f). This is higher than the EU27 average of 16% (2010).
Even though the rate has declined, it still remains considerably
higher than the rate for the working age population (of 15.7%,
aged 18-64) (2010) (The Social Protection Committee, 2012,
Table 5). There was also a gap of 3.4 percentage points
between the at risk of poverty rate for older men (18%) in
2010 and that for older women (21.4%) (Eurostat, 2012f).
Similarly, older women were more likely to be experiencing
severe material deprivation in 2010, with a rate of 10.8% as
opposed to 7.9% for older men (The Social Protection
Committee, 2012, Table 11).
Working Poor: The rate of poverty in Portugal for people who
work and who still do not earn enough to protect them from
poverty (the working poor) is 10.3% (2011), which is above
the 2010 EU27 average of 8.4% (in 2010) (Eurostat, 2012g).
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PAROP: People at risk of poverty, 60% threshold
SMD: Severely Materially Deprived
VLWI: Very Low Work Intensity (See Glossary for definitions)
36 That is the 60% at risk of poverty threshold is 60% of median equivalised incomes. The at risk of poverty threshold in Portugal for a single person was €5,207 in 2010, and it fell to
€5,046 in 2011. See Appendix 5
Portugal’s employment rate declined rapidly from 2008 and
has fallen markedly (-4.2%) in the year to Quarter 2, 2012, a
decline exceeded only by Greece (European Commission, 2012,
p 13, 69). Portugal’s unemployment rate is rising rapidly and
(in July 2012) is the second highest of the 22 countries for
which data are available. The youth unemployment rate is very
high (36.4%, July 2012), and the long-term unemployment
rate is increasing and represents around half of those who are
unemployed.
As already mentioned, when it comes to assessing the position
of Portugal’s residents relative to poverty, the time-lag in
Discussion: Impacts on Vulnerable Groups
availability of data makes it difficult to give an up-to-date
picture. That being said, by comparison with European
averages, Portugal has high rates of poverty. There are signs of
increase between 2010 and 2011 in the at risk of poverty rate
(which is the most commonly used poverty indicator across
Europe). Portugal’s rates are higher than the EU27 average
rates across most of the indicators that are generally used
across Europe. The rate of poverty of children increased in
2008 and has stayed at that relatively high level since. Rates
for both children and older people (particularly older women)
remain of particular concern.
The Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe
reported on concerns for vulnerable groups in Portugal
following a visit in May 2012. Among these groups he
highlighted the situation of children, older people and Roma
people. The Commissioner drew attention to how the
combined effects of unemployment, cuts in salaries, increased
taxes and reduced social and unemployment benefits has
resulted in growing poverty among many Portuguese families.
The Commissioner (Muižnieks, 2012) noted that:
5 Child poverty is rising with evictions due to non-payment
of mortgages having a particularly negative impact, and
budgetary restrictions in education being harmful in an
overall context where there is a high rate of school drop-
outs. All of these factors suggest the risk of a resurgence of
child labour, notably in the informal economic sector and
agriculture.
5 Older people on low incomes are affected by the austerity
measures including freezing of pensions and cuts in social
benefits, increases in costs of health care, public transport,
gas, electricity and food products affecting especially those
living in isolated rural areas. Violence towards older people
has increased with reportedly almost 40% of the older
population in Portugal having suffered abuse within the
family.
5 Roma continue to suffer from social exclusion and various
forms of discrimination, particularly as regards housing,
education and access to employment.
For its part, according to Caritas Portuguesa, the Government’s
Social Emergency Programme is not able to deal with the
suffering caused by the crisis and the austerity measures. They
point to a mismatch between the measures undertaken and
the immediate and unfolding reality for families. The crisis is
not well understood by many people leaving those affected
without hope (Caritas Portuguesa, 2012). For many of the
families that Caritas Portugal is supporting, it is their first time
having to seek help outside their family.
An analysis using the EUROMOD model of the impact of
austerity measures implemented up to mid-2011 in Portugal
made some important findings about the way that the measures
are impacting across income groups. In particular, the study
found that the measures were regressive – meaning that lower
income groups lost a higher proportion of their income than
higher income groups (Callan et al, 2011). In fact, of the six
countries considered in that research37 (up to mid-2011),
Portugal was the only country in which percentage losses were
considerably larger (to 2011) in the first and second decile
groups than higher up the income distribution – in other words
the poorest people were hardest hit (Callan et al, 2011, p.13).
Furthermore, the increase in the standard rate of VAT (in 2011)
was found to have resulted in a significant reduction in the
level of household income, with the poorest quintiles (or
poorest 20%) being disproportionately affected when
compared to the top ones (Callan et al, 2011).
Across most of the countries included in their study
researchers found that households with children have been
particularly affected by increases in household incomes as a
result of austerity measures. This includes Portugal where the
adverse effect on children is particularly marked for
households with low incomes (Sutherland & Matsganis, 2011,
p3; Callan et al, 2011, p13, 17).
It may be worth noting that the research just referred to of the
impact of austerity measures on households did not include
the impact of cuts to services like health, social care or
education. These cuts are most likely to particularly affect
those who do not have sufficient income to compensate for
them. Bearing this in mind the researchers note that their
analysis does not represent the full picture of the impact of
austerity measures (Callan et al, 2011, p 16). Proposals to cut
expenditure on education would have to take account of the
fact that Portugal has one of the highest rates of early school
leaving38 in Europe (23.2% as opposed to an EU27 average of
13.5% in 2011). Any worsening of this situation would be
detrimental to the life chances of those involved and also, in
the longer term, to the economy. Portugal also has a tertiary
education attainment rate39 below the average (26.1% as
opposed to an EU27 average rate of 34.6% in 2011) (Eurostat,
2012m).
A very comprehensive list of austerity measures was agreed in
summer 2012 with the Troika under Portugal’s assistance
package (IMF 2012a), which included further reductions in social
transfers and pensions, cuts in education and controlling
health-care costs as outlined above. Given the high levels of
unemployment and poverty already being experienced in
Portugal, and the findings that early measures disproportionately
affected poorer people, very serious impacts might be anticipated
on vulnerable groups. Protests and court challenges are now
affecting the ability of Government to proceed with further
measures. As of early November 2012, the IMF is meeting with
the Government ahead of schedule to identify areas where it can
make additional cuts to spending (Reuters, 2012).
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37 Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Spain and UK
38 Early leavers from education and training refers to the % of the population aged 18-24 with at most lower secondary education and not in further education or training (Eurostat, 2012m)
39 Tertiary education attainment levels are assessed as the share of the population aged 30-34 years who have successfully completed university or university-like (tertiary-level)
education (Eurostat, 2012m)
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Similar to Ireland, in Spain housing-market and banking crises
led to a sovereign debt crisis (Menendez, 2012, p 14). Factors
which fuelled the property market boom included membership
of the Eurozone and availability of cheap credit from
international banks and other lending institutions as well as
favourable tax treatment for mortgage payments (Menendez,
2012, p 14). Prior to 2007, while there was significant private
debt (that is, borrowings by citizens), Spain’s government
borrowing was not high by relative standards (see Appendices
1 & 2). But Spain had changed from the 1990s,when it had
little foreign borrowing, to relying heavily on external lenders
(Menendez, 2012).
With the end of the housing boom in 2007 and the global
financial crisis, government deficit and general gross debt
increased from 2007 on as Table 13 shows. This was contributed
to by the government’s measures to try and rescue its banking
sector, which had been severely affected by the collapse in
property prices and by defaulting borrowers whose incomes had
dropped due to the global recession.
All of these factors, and a forecast that the fiscal deficit would
be 8% of GDP (rather than the 6% forecast) for 2011, caused
the Government to introduce a series of measures at the end
of 2011 (IMF, 2012c). Nonetheless, market tensions in Spring
2012 necessitated seeking financial assistance and in June
there was an announcement that assistance would be sought
to recapitalize the banks (IMF, 2012c, p 6). Financing of up to
€100 billion has been made available to recapitalise the banks
(IMF, 2012f, p3).
Background and Government Finances
While Spain is not a ‘programme’ country in the sense that
Greece, Ireland and Portugal are – assistance is being made
available relative to its banks’ recapitalization from EFSF/ESM
and there is surveillance by the IMF (IMF, 2012b). The
European Council has given Spain another year to reduce its
deficit below 3% of GDP40.
One of the differences relative to Ireland is the sheer size of
the Spanish economy – the fourth biggest in Europe, and as
such it was considered ‘too big to fail.’ Amongst the measures
envisaged for the management of Spain’s banking crisis is debt
sharing with the hybrid/subordinated bondholders (IMF,
2012c).
According to the IMF, Spain is now in the middle of an
unprecedented double-dip recession, with access to market
financing costly, unemployment high and public debt
increasing and sectors of the financial sector lacking capital
and access to markets. This situation poses risks to the rest of
Europe (IMF, 2012c). The IMF considers that the outlook is very
difficult (IMF, 2012c, p 10).
As Table 14 shows, following a contraction from 2007, growth
was very weak in 2011 and the forecasts are not good. The
economy shrank in quarter 2, 2012, which was the third
consecutive quarter showing a decline (European Commission,
2012, p. 9, 69).
The latest analysis from the European Commission suggests
that revenue shortfalls, higher interest payments and rising
social transfers (due presumably to rising unemployment) have
almost offset savings from expenditure cuts (European
Commission, 2012b, p 68).
Spain
40 The plan is as follows: 2012: 6.3% (previously 5.3%); 2013: 4.5% (previously 3%); 2014: 2.8% (previously 2.2%) (IMF, 2012c)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Government deficit/surplus, % GDP -0.1 1.3 2.4 1.9 -4.5 -11.2 -9.7 -9.4
General Government Gross Debt % GDP 46.3 43.2 39.7 36.3 40.2 53.9 61.5 69.3
Source: Eurostat, 2012j,2012k, tsdde410; gov_dd_edpt1
SPAIN TABLE 13 Government Debt Rates
Youth unemployment (age 15-24)
is a particular problem, with a rate of 52.9%.
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Percentage change on previous year
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 (f) 2013 (f)
EU (27 countries) 3.3 3.2 0.3 -4.3 2.1 1.5 -0.3* 0.4*
Spain 4.1 3.5 0.9 -3.7 -0.3 0.4 -1.4* -1.4*
Source: Eurostat, 2012, tec00115;
*European Commission, 2012b - f: forecast - IMF forecast: for 2012: -2.3 %; for 2013: -0.7% (IMF, 2012f, p. 66)
SPAIN TABLE 14 Real GDP growth rate - volume
Responding to the economic crisis, Spain introduced a number
of stimulus measures in 2008-2009, some of which were
reversed subsequently in 2010 when austerity measures were
introduced as a response to pressure from financial markets
and the European Commission due to the rising deficit (Callan
et al, 2011, p 8). Measures introduced in the 2010-11 period
included:
5 elimination of universal birth grant from January 2011,
5 freeze of the Indicator for Social benefits (IPREM) in 2012 –
this affected child benefit and unemployment insurance and
assistance,
5 tightening of the eligibility conditions for the Temporary
Unemployment Protection Programme (Programa Temporal
de Proteccion por Desempleo e Insercion),
5 reduction of child benefit for children under 2 (from €500-
€291) in 2011
5 means-testing of the €400 personal tax credit from 2010,
5 cut to pay of Civil Servants (5% average, but could be up to
9.7%) in 2010, pay freeze in 2011,
5 standard rate of VAT increased from 16% to 18%, and
reduced rate increased from 7% to 8% from July 2010,
5 increased taxes for top earners (over €120,000) and
increases in taxes on capital income.
(Callan et al, 2011).
As it became clear that Spain’s deficit was going to be worse
than projected for 2011, Spain’s new Government introduced
measures in December 2011 and subsequently in a draft
budget in April 2012. They included:
5 expenditure cuts in education and health equal to 1% of GDP,
5 increases on marginal tax rates on personal and capital
income and on property sales.
(IMF, 2012c, p. 19).
There were also some ‘offsetting measures’ such as:
5 slight pension increases,
5 reinstatement of a mortgage deduction for housing,
5 extension of the lower VAT rate for property transactions.
(IMF, 2012c, p. 19)
Overall, the Budget 2012 measures presented to Parliament in
April 2012 involved a ratio of two thirds expenditure cuts, one
third revenue raising (IMF, 2012c, p 18, 19).
Policy Responses
In July 2012 the Government proposed a series of measures
including:
5 VAT increases (standard rate increased from 18 to 21%;
reduced rate from 8 to 10%; super-reduced rate unchanged
at 4%) with some products moving to the higher rate,
5 unemployment benefit reduced (with the replacement rate
after six months falling from 60% to 50%),
5 mortgage income tax deduction to be removed,
5 social security contributions reduced by one percentage
point in 2013 and a further point in 2014
5 extra payment in December to civil servants suspended for
2012 (equivalent to nearly a monthly wage)
(IMF, 2012c, p.2).
A range of other measures are also in train aimed at introducing
greater flexibility in employment contracts and dismissals
(IMF, 2012c, p. 29).
In September 2012 an increased sales tax led to the sharpest
monthly fall on record in retail sales (Reuters, 2012).
Austerity measures have led to increasingly frequent protests
and caused a rise in separatist sentiments especially in
Catalonia (Reuters, 2012). A general strike was held on
November 14th, 2012 the second against the new Government
since they took office in December 2011. It was marked by
violent clashes in several cities.
In November also the issue of mortgage debt is high on the
political agenda as a series of suicides associated with
evictions caused the government to promise action on
mortgage debt for those hardest hit. Banks have repossessed
some 400,000 properties since 2008 (though not all of them
are homes) (Reuters, 2012).
In the Eurobarometer survey of the views of Europeans on the
social climate, Spain’s ranking has decreased in every year
since the survey started (2009), and stands at -2.1 in 2012 in
eighteenth position out of EU27 (European Commission, 2012,
p 43-46).
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Figure 9, below, shows how Spain’s employment rate declined
rapidly from 2007 reaching 61.6% in 2011 as opposed to an
EU27 average of 68.6% for those aged 20-64. The employment
level at quarter 1, 2012) is 59.6% for people aged 20-64,
extending the persistent downward trend observed since 2008.
Latest figures suggest that the employment rate declined
markedly (-4%) in the year to quarter 2, 2012, representing
745,000 people. This decline was exceeded only by Greece (-
9%) and (marginally) by Portugal (-4.2%). (European
Commission, 2012, p 13, 69).
Employment/Unemployment
In 2011, Spain had the highest unemployment rate in the EU at
21.7% well above the EU27 average rate of 9.6%, and
representing some 4.9 million people (Eurostat, 2012i). By July
2012 the rate had worsened further to 25.1%. It was still the
highest rate in Europe and was 20.6 percentage points above
the country with the lowest unemployment rate (Austria), the
largest gap seen in a decade (European Commission, 2012, p
14, 72). Latest figures suggest that the rate has worsened again
and in September, 2012 stands at 25.8% (just under 6million
people), the highest in EU27 countries and well above the
current EU27 average of 10.6% (Eurostat, 2012n). See Table
15, below, and Appendix 7.
Youth unemployment (age 15-24) is a particular problem, with
a rate of 52.9% (July 2012), a rate which is exceeded only by
that for Greece (55.4%, June 2012) and approaching 2.5 times
the average rate (of 22.5%) (European Commission, 2012, p 72).
Spain’s long-term unemployment rate has increased in the past
year (to quarter 1, 2012) by 1.7 percentage points, and now
stands at 10.3 %, second only to Greece and well above the
EU27 average (4.5%) (European Commission, 2012). A high
proportion (41.6%) of those amongst the unemployed was
long-term unemployed (without work for 12 months or more)
at the end of 2011 (Eurostat, 2012i).
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Source: Eurostat, 2012b, t2020_10
2011 2012
Unemployment – rate (%) 21.7% 25.1% (July) - 25.8% (Sept)
Unemployment – number of people 4.9million 5.9million (Sept)
Youth Unemployment Rate (15-24) 52.9% (July)
Long-term Unemployment Rate (unemployed for 12 months or more) 10.3% (Q1)
Share of unemployment that is long-term 41.6%
Source: Eurostat, 2012i; Eurostat, 2012n, European Commission, 2012, p 72
SPAIN TABLE 15 Unemployment-Headline Statistics
For Spain comparable figures on poverty are published for
2011 (with a 2010 reference period), but this represents the
relatively early stages of the impact of the crisis and does not
show the impact of many of the measures introduced in Spain
more recently.
Nonetheless, the combined ‘at risk of poverty or social
exclusion’ indicator used under the Europe 2020 strategy has
risen in Spain each year since 2008 (when the rate was
22.9%). The 2011 rate is 27%, representing an increase of
some two million people since 2008 and above the EU27
average of 23.4% (Eurostat, 2012c.).
Rates for each of the three measures that make up the
combined ‘at risk of poverty or social exclusion’ indicator are
set out in Appendix 3 and shown below in Figure 10.
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Source: Eurostat, 2012c, t2020,51,52,53
PAROP: People at risk of poverty, 60% threshold
SMD: Severely Materially Deprived
VLWI: Very Low Work Intensity (See Glossary for definitions)
As Figure 10 shows, a sizable increase in the at risk of poverty
rate for Spain is in evidence since 2009 as well as in the third
indicator, people in households with very low work intensity
(meaning that the adults in the household are not working or
are working very little). The at risk of poverty rate increased
steadily from 2009 (when it was 19.5%) to 20.7% in 2010 and
to 21.8% in 2011, representing (in 2011) just under 10 million
people (Eurostat, 2012c). The increase in the rate between
2009 and 2010 of 1.2 percentage points was almost the
largest increase in EU27 (exceeded only by that of Slovenia)
(Social Protection Committee, 2012, p. 11), and the rate of
increase in 2011 has been of a similar amount.41
This rate is well above the EU27 average of 16.4%. In fact, in
2010 (the latest year for which comparable data are available)
Spain had one of the highest at risks of poverty in EU27, with
a rate equal to that of Bulgaria and only marginally behind
the rates in Romania and Latvia. See Appendix 5.
The rise in the at risk of poverty rate occurred notwithstanding
the fact that the 60% risk of poverty threshold has fallen each
year between 2009 and 2011 in line with a fall in incomes
generally42 (Eurostat, 2012h).
The rise in people living in households with very low work
intensity is particularly striking having risen from 6.2% in
2008 to 12.2% in 2011 (Eurostat, 2012c), an increase of 6
percentage points, and signalling signs of long-term exclusion
from work, something that is also reflected in the long-term
unemployment rate already mentioned.
When the share of people who are living with less than 40%
of the median income is examined, there has been a marked
increase between 2008 and 2010, going from 8.2% to 10.1%,
an increase of almost 2 percentage points (Eurostat, 2012d,
tessi126). This suggests that there are signs of a deepening of
poverty levels amongst the poorest people.
Another indication of the depth of poverty is the relative
median at-risk-of-poverty gap, which helps to quantify just
how poor the poor are. The at risk of poverty gap has widened
in Spain by 7.2 percentage points between 2008 and 2011, to
reach 30.6%, which is one of the worst rates in Europe,
exceeded only by four European countries (Latvia, Romania,
Bulgaria and Lithuania) (Eurostat, 2012q).
Child Poverty: Spain’s rate of child poverty has been high
relative to the European average since at least 2005 (when
comparable data are available from Eurostat). The 2011 rate is
27.2% and it has been increasing since 2009 (when it was
23.7%), showing a 3.5 percentage points increase in two years
(Eurostat, 2012e). The EU27 average rate was 20.5% in 2010
(Eurostat, 2012e) when Spain’s child poverty rate was
exceeded only by Bulgaria, Latvia and Romania (2010 being
the last year for which sufficient data is available to make
comparisons).
Older People: At 21.7% in 2010 and 20.8% in 2011, the rate of
poverty in Spain for people aged 65+ is high by comparison to
the EU27 average of 16% (2010) (Eurostat, 2012f). It is also
higher than the risk of poverty rate for the Spanish working age
population (19% in 2010) (The Social Protection Committee,
2012, Table 5). However, the rate for those aged 65+ has fallen
since 2008. Rates are higher for women (21.8%) than men
(19.5%, 2011) (Eurostat, 2012f). The EU Social Protection
Committee has pointed out generally in relation to pensions, that
improvements in the position of over 65s have been assessed in
relation to changes in the poverty thresholds rather than
improvements in real terms in their economic situation (2012,
p 20).
Working Poor: The rate of poverty in Spain for people who
work and who still do not earn enough to protect them from
poverty (the working poor) is 12.3% (2011). This is one of the
highest rates in Europe (EU27), exceeded only by Romania
(Eurostat, 2012g).
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41 Sufficient comparable data are not available to assess how the 2011 rate of increase compares with the rates of increase in other countries.
42 The 60% at risk of poverty threshold is 60% of median equivalised incomes. The at risk of poverty threshold in Spain for a single person was €7,980 in 2009, €7,818 in 2010, and it fell
again to €7,509 in 2011. See Appendix 5.
43 That is, living below the 40% of median income line as opposed to the more commonly recognised line of 60%
44 Bulgarian, Latvia and Romania (2010) (Eurostat, 2012e)
In Spain the economic crisis has adversely affected a
population that already had a high rate of income poverty –
having demonstrated an at risk of poverty rate above the EU27
average since at least 2005. (For rates, see Appendix 3).
The time lag in the availability from Eurostat of data on
poverty means that the figures set out in this report relate to
the early years of the economic crisis. Notwithstanding that,
income poverty can be seen to have been affecting huge
Discussion: Impacts on Vulnerable Groups
numbers of people with just under 10 million people living at
risk of poverty and with the increase between 2009 and 2010
being one of the largest increases in EU27. There are also signs
of a deepening of poverty levels with a sizable increase
between 2008 and 2010 in the rate of those who are poorest43.
Child poverty is a particular problem with Spain’s rate
increasing since 2009 and exceeded only by three eastern
European countries.44 A high proportion of those who work do
not earn enough to bring them above the poverty threshold.
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The at risk of poverty rate for older people continues to exceed
that for the working age population.
As discussed above, Spain has the highest unemployment rate
in Europe (EU27). There are also very high rates of both youth
unemployment and long term unemployment, which are both
second only to Greece. Youth unemployment is a particular issue
with more than half of those aged 15-24 being unemployed.
There are big income gaps between those on permanent and
those on temporary contracts. Spain has the highest share of
temporary workers in OECD countries (IMF, 2012c, p. 28). Young
people are, of course, particularly affected by unemployment
and those that are employed are often employed on temporary
contracts (IMF, 2012c).
The IMF recognises that income inequality is rising in Spain,
with one of the worst deteriorations in income distributions
since the crisis (IMF, 2012c, p. 8).
Net emigration has started again for the first time since the
early 1990s (IMF, 2012c, p. 8).
Researchers who studied the impact of austerity measures
introduced to mid 2011 across 6 countries (and as such have
captured impacts of the early measures introduced), have
noted some features relating to Spain:
5 As with most of the other countries included in the study,
austerity measures impacted more on households with
children than on those without (Callan et al, 2011, p 13, 27),
5 Cuts to benefits have had a particularly large effect on
households in the lower part of income distribution while
cuts in public sector pay affect those on higher incomes
more (Callan et al, 2011, p 13).
Furthermore, while some measures had the effect of distributing
the cuts in income relatively evenly across all income groups (in
other words, each decile group paid roughly the same proportion
of income), this was changed by VAT increases, which placed a
larger burden on those on low incomes relative than on those
on high incomes (Callan et al, 2011, p. 13). Of course, even if
the effects of the crisis and the measures introduced to address
it had proportionately affected people on low incomes and those
on high incomes equally, this would not say anything about
ability to contribute of the poorest people.45
Again we repeat that the study cited (Callan et al, 2011) dates
from 2011 and would not take into account the subsequent
proposed changes in VAT, which it seems reasonable to anticipate
would continue this trend towards disproportionately affecting
lower income households. In Spain the crisis (and measures
adopted to address it) is worsening levels of poverty that were
already high.
On the ground, calls on the services of Caritas Spain have
increased by some 170% since the start of the crisis. They point
to the adverse impact of austerity measures on people
dependent on social services and an increase in people lacking
food and money to pay utility bills, as well as people needing
jobs and social interaction. They also express concern about
childhood poverty rates and about malnutrition in children due
especially to cutbacks affecting school meals (Caritas Europa,
2012). They also point to families now depending on a single
income of a grandparent’s low pension, and they are concerned
at an increase in tension within families, which the crisis has
precipitated as people have to rely on family members for
essential needs like never before.
In addition, while it is impossible to analyse impacts of cuts to
services like health and education in detail in this report, it is
reasonable to assume that they may particularly affect those
who are poorest and who do not have sufficient income to
compensate for them. Decreasing the educational budget in
Spain has to be considered in light of the fact that Spain has
one of the highest rates of early school leaving46 in Europe
(26.5% as opposed to an EU27 average rate of 13.5% in 2011)
(Eurostat, 2012m), as measures which might worsen this
situation would be short-sighted in view of the personal cost
- in terms of life chances and even health - and indeed the
cost to the economy in the longer term.
As set out above a comprehensive list of further cuts and
austerity measures were proposed in summer 2012, which
included further reductions in welfare and increases in VAT.
The impact of these measures on vulnerable groups is likely to
be serious, given the high levels of unemployment and poverty
already being experienced in Spain, and the finding that
increases in VAT have already disproportionately affected
poorer people.
45 It is only to be expected that better off households pay a larger share, as they have a higher share of total income – it does not signify that the burden of the measures in relation to
their ability to pay is also larger and it does not tell us if the distribution is equitable or not (Callan et al, 2011 p 12, 13).
46 Early leavers from education and training refers to the % of the population aged 18-24 with at most lower secondary education and not in further education or training (Eurostat, 2012m)
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Caritas member organisations and affiliates work in a wide
range of contexts and in a range of ways across Europe, and
they are each responding to the current crisis. Many provide
services to people in need, others focus on work for social
change through advocacy. Five of these organisations have
contributed to this report by gathering relevant data, by sharing
accounts of their work to support people affected by the crisis,
and by reflecting on the impacts of the crisis and of austerity
measures as they observe them relative to different groups.
In this section we include some accounts of their work, some
case studies representing their different approaches and
illustrating their different impacts, and we finish by listing
some of the challenges they face.
Caritas Athens Refugee Programme has concentrated in recent
years mainly on the needs of refugees and migrants. They have
a fixed staff of only five people – a cook, a cleaner, a secretary,
a doorman and a social worker – who are assisted by more than
seventy part-time volunteers who help on a daily, weekly or
monthly basis to keep the centre functioning. The work involves
5 serving up to 300 meals a day,
5 distributing food parcels to nearly 100 families a month
(including immigrant families and now Greek families also),
5 sorting and distributing free clothes and bed-linen twice-
weekly, and
5 providing language lessons in Greek and English using
volunteer teachers.
A social worker and a number of volunteer doctors and lawyers
are involved in education (in health care and hygiene), in
organizing vaccinations for children (otherwise children of
migrants may miss out on vaccinations given routinely
through the school system) and in routing asylum cases
towards professional help.
They report that support to a range of groups is also given by
Caritas Athens and the Archbishopric, and also through local
Greece
organisations of Caritas and parishes throughout Greece.
Those supported include low income families (many of whom
cannot pay their food or electricity bills or their health-care
costs), people at risk of losing their homes, older people who
lack family support and the prison community.
Groups particularly affected by the crisis that the Caritas
Athens Refugee Programme works with include single parent
families with young children (for whom access to kindergarten
facilities is becoming more difficult due to closures). However,
they are also registering concern (as stated in Part Two, above)
in respect of disabled people (whose cases are being re-
examined) and disabled children, people coming to the end of
access to unemployment payments (which are subject to a
one-year limit), pensioners on the minimum pension,
pensioners with medical problems (who must now pay in
advance for medicines and await reimbursement, which can
take months), and immigrants, many of whom are faced with
unemployment (which soon leads to their status becoming
undocumented/illegal, despite having been in Greece for
years). The position of new immigrants who continue to come
to the country is also difficult.
Social Justice Ireland is a non-political organisation of
individuals and groups across Ireland committed to the
concept of a just society. It has an unparalleled reputation for
research, advocacy and dissemination of accurate, evidence-
based social analysis and public policy in relation, in particular,
to issues of social justice, poverty, inequality, social exclusion,
and sustainability. It works with Caritas Europa on a wide
range of issues particularly at an EU level.
Ireland
Social Justice Ireland draws on the work being done by its
members in a wide range of local contexts. It builds on this
and ensures that the voice and experience, the knowledge and
wisdom of its members are reflected in the various arenas in
which decisions are made. In all of this Social Justice Ireland
will seek to promote the development of all people and the
whole person simultaneously and in solidarity.
Programmes and Initiatives
of Caritas Members
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Within its programmes Social Justice Ireland:
5 Plays an active part in the national Social Dialogue process
in Ireland and the EU,
5 Produces and publishes an annual socio-economic review and
regular policy briefings on relevant topics and maintains a
website with relevant up-to-date material on a wide range of
social justice topics,
5 Resources and supports a post-graduate Masters degree in
Social Justice and Public Policy programme,
5 Leads a Budget analysis project which includes the analysis
and critique of Government’s annual Budget and makes
submissions to Government and other relevant bodies on
policy issues as appropriate,
5 Organises an annual social policy conference on a relevant
topic with broad participation from across a wide range of
sectors,
5 Networks with other groups and organisations and maintains
representation on a range of public bodies,
5 Maintains an on-going dialogue with a wide range of
national and international agencies and bodies including
the International Monetary Fund, the European Commission
and the European Central Bank.
In the context of this research Social Justice Ireland has
consistently researched and published detailed analysis of the
situation as it has developed, addressed its causes and
consequences, monitored the impact of Government initiatives
and annual budgets, dialogued with the troika (IMF, European
Commission and the European Central Bank) and developed
alternatives to Government and troika proposals, alternatives
that would protect the vulnerable and promote economic
development in a sustainable manner while protecting the
basic infrastructure of Irish society.
Caritas Italy, along with local churches, and sometimes along
with local authorities and a wide range of actors from civil
society, delivers a range of programmes to service users.
Programmes include:
5 microcredit/microloans, which are made to families and to
small businesses (sometimes also involving local banks),
5 grants and donations,
5 innovative projects, which are very varied (see below) often
aiming help families and individuals to meet basic needs,
5 information services, which offer counselling and orientation
on issues like employment and housing (often working with
other organisations such as Unions and others) (Caritas
Italiana, 2012c).
The highest number of projects is in the South (41.5%),
followed by the North (33%) and the Middle (25.5%).
Italy
Under the heading of ‘innovative projects’ a wide variety of
services are offered. Their main aim is to help families and
individuals to meet their basic needs or to modify their life-
styles. They can also include second-hand stores, cards,
organising mutual help between families, working with
supermarkets and big stores, offering training to help create
new businesses or social cooperatives, budgeting help,
psychological counselling centres for business people who are
in financial difficulty, new forms of home care (such as helping
with carrying shopping).
As already mentioned in Part Two, Caritas Italy has noticed
an increase in projects across all categories, with the exception
of providing microloans, where repayment has become an
issue for many borrowers (and sometimes local banks are
withdrawing cooperation). In just one year there has been a
22.2% increase in projects. In two years (since 2010), the
increase has been 70.7%.
Caritas Portugal is a national service of the Portuguese Bishops
Conference for the social pastoral action of the Church. The
aim is integrated human development and social
transformation, working for a more just society with the
participation of those affected by any form of exclusion.
In Portugal there are 20 diocesan Cáritas, each of which
responds to the local needs and accordingly they offer different
types of social responses. Overall, the Cáritas network deals with
a range of social problems that includes problems of children,
older people, migrants, Roma, people affected by drug abuse,
by HIV/AIDS, homelessness and by many other issues. Cáritas
interventions are conducted by volunteers and paid staff who
work closely with communities.
Portugal
Caritas Portugal, the national office, is active in a range of areas
including training programmes for pastoral agents,
communications, social policy, advocacy, responding to
emergencies (both national and international) and international
cooperation. The international emergencies are supported
through the Cáritas network and with the national partners.
Caritas Portugal is a member Caritas Internationalis, Caritas
Europa, the National Confederation of Solidarity Institutions,
the Portuguese Confederation of Volunteering, the non-
Governmental Forum for Social Inclusion and the Portuguese
Platform of NGO’s.
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In recent months, the Caritas Athens Refugee programme has
helped immigrants and also many Greek families whose
circumstances have changed and who now find themselves in
dire need. Below we include two case studies to give examples
of the types of problems that their programme is encountering.
Caritas Athens reports that faced with the crisis there is the
emergence of a more targeted and proactive approach by a
number of NGOs in Athens. Amongst them they list the Greek
Orthodox Church, the Municipality of Athens and the private
charitable foundation of the Niarchos family and others.
Greece
Caritas Member Programmes –
Responding to the Crisis
Caritas Spain operates through 68 diocesan offices that
manage the work of some 65,000 volunteers. Caritas Spain
works to support vulnerable and marginalized people, the poor
and needy, immigrants and young people in difficulty, among
others. It supports research into the causes of poverty and
regularly produces publications on related issues. Caritas Spain
collaborates with partners in humanitarian and development
programmes in countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle
East and Latin America.
Spain
In 2011, Caritas Spain’s projects succeeded in integrating
13,000 people in the labour market; they spent €33million in
giving direct help (such as in paying bills, school-books,
health-related costs), and they helped 1,015,276 people. The
numbers helped had increased hugely by 2011 from around
300,000 in 2007 (Caritas Europa, 2012).
M. is a 33 year old unemployed, single mother with a 4 year-old
child. The father of the child did not legally recognise him and
abandoned them both when it was discovered that he was autistic
and had serious motor-coordination problems. She had no work
and went to live with her widowed mother, who has a €500 euro
monthly pension (from next year this income will be reduced by
€1.000 per annum). She came to the Caritas Athens centre asking
for food and for help to get her child accepted by one of the very
few day centres for children with a learning disability. Up to now
this has not been possible (as there were no places available in any
special school). Our social worker is encouraging her to finish her
secondary education while her mother looks after the child.
Mrs.DB is a 37 years old Polish mother of two children. She was
married to a Polish man and they were both legal and working at
a café in Athens before having children. When the first was born,
as they were both working legally, he was able to attend a state
day care. When recession started, she lost her job and when she
became pregnant again, her husband left her. The Catholic Church
provides for the rent of her flat and the Social Services of Caritas
Athens Refugee Programme provide her with food and got the
smaller child accepted at one of the day care centre of the
Municipality. She has found a small cleaning job and is looking for
more work. Her husband refuses to help and she has no money for
a lawyer to start legal proceedings to obtain his help to support
the children. She has no family and no house in Poland, therefore
she stays in Greece. She is still theoretically legal through her
husband if he has legal work. If not, the status of both will become
irregular.
Caritas Athens Refugee Programme
CASE STUDY
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The experience of Social Justice Ireland represents a case study
of a response to the crisis and to the imposition of austerity
measures on the level of advocacy.
Ireland
As part of its work in the context of Ireland’s current bailout
agreement, Social Justice Ireland meets with the ‘troika’
(IMF/EC.ECB) a number of times each year. At its meeting with
the ‘troika’ in October 2012, Social Justice Ireland presented a
detailed Briefing which analysed the selective use of data by Troika
organisations in some of their recent publications. The Briefing
showed how this misuse of data is leading to inaccurate analysis
which in turn is producing inappropriate policy recommendations
for Ireland.
The ‘Troika’s analysis sets most of the parameters for the Irish
Government’s decisions on the Budget and other key areas of
policy. So it is crucially important that the analysis is as accurate
CASE STUDY
as possible. The selective use of data identified in the Briefing
concerned five key areas (i.e. the poverty rate, the reduction of
welfare payments to unemployed people over time, the changes
in welfare rates generally in the past, on replacement ratios for job
seekers and on the distribution of ‘hits’ following from Government
decisions in recent years).
Under each of these issues the Briefing identified where data had
been selectively chosen in recent troika publications, where this
selectivity has led to inaccurate analysis which in turn has led to
inappropriate policy proposals being made.
The analysis was not disputed by the troika. Social Justice Ireland
was invited to engage with the IMF and the European Commission
technical teams on the analytical issues identified and on policy
proposals set out by Social Justice Ireland. This dialogue is on-
going. It remains to be seen if the inappropriate policy proposals
presented by the ‘troika’ will be taken up by Government.
Social Justice Ireland
Caritas Italy faces increased demands on its services and is
engaged in a range of responses across the country. National
monitoring revealed the presence of 985 anti-crisis projects
by 212 Italian dioceses (out of a total of 220 dioceses) (Caritas
Italiana, 2012c). Amongst these initiatives are:
5 Barnaba Project, Let’s Give Credit to Hope (Caritas Andria,
Puglia, South Italy)
This is a microcredit project for young unemployed people
(aged 18-35), aimed at supporting productive activities and
creating new jobs. The project offers financial support to
those who cannot obtain it elsewhere, as well as training,
technical assistance, tutoring, work orientation, organising
solidarity networks, and supporting new life-styles. The project
finances the start-up of different types of new business and
small enterprises: social cooperation, associations, freelancing
and professional activities in the social field.
5 One Hour For You, Caritas Teramo-Atri (Abruzzo, Central-
South Italy)
In cooperation with Banca Popolare Ancona, a fund has
been established to give practical help to families that have
lost all sources of income through offers from local families
that have a regular work. The idea is to offer regular help
equivalent of one hour work. The beneficiaries don’t receive
money, but, after an interview, they can take advantage of
periods of training (average 3 months) with local
companies.
5 Budgeting Project, Caritas Nardo-Gallipoli (Puglia, South
Italy)
This project helps families amongst the ‘new poor’ to control
household spending, taking account of family basic needs
and the amount of household income.
Italy
5 Project Penelope, Caritas Treviso (North Italy)
This project consists of a specialized counseling centre
(Centro di Ascolto), which helps entrepreneurs and business
people in financial difficulty from a human and relational
point of view. The project offers psychological tools to
develop resilience and deeper understanding and awareness
of their personal situation and social context.
5 Solidarity General Store (Emporio Della Solidarieta), Carits
Roma
The Emporio is a real supermarket (500 square meters), with
automated pay desk, trolleys etc. A magnetic card
authorizes an allocation of spending for people affected by
poverty who are screened through the social services of
local authorities or the Centri di Ascolto of roman parishes.
The project is based on a partnership between Caritas
diocesana di Roma and Roman Municipality.
5 Loan of Hope, Italian Episcopal Conference (CEI), Caritas
Italy, Italian Bank Association
Established in 2009 by the Italian Episcopal Conference
(CEI) and the National Association of Italian banks, the
project grants loans at an affordable interest rate, based on
an ad hoc fund established by CEI. The beneficiaries are
small enterprises (family businesses) and families in difficult
situation. Since 2009, 1,662 families have been helped, and
10 million euro has been provided.
5 Caritas Services Against Poverty and Anti-Usury Foundations
According to last data (January 2010), diocesan Caritas
promote and/or manage 4,991 activities, services and projects
aimed at helping people experiencing poverty. Amongst them
are some 3,583 distribution centres of primary goods, 449
social canteens, 414 shelters and hostels for homeless people,
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and 230 residential services for immigrants. Importantly there
are 146 anti-usury diocesan foundations, and there has been
an increase in this area as many people turn to unlicensed
lenders and are in difficulty due to the very high interest
rates. The Foundations offer different forms of help such as
psychological assistance, privileged access to small loans,
accompaniment to legal practices and more.
E is 40 years old, married, mother of two children (6 and 9 years).
She had a stable occupation as an employee in a fabric factory.
Her family took out a mortgage to buy their house, counting on
two stable salaries, that would allow the family to lead a simple
but decent life. In July 2010 the company where E was working
closed and she was made unemployed. Although the local labour
market is difficult, E didn’t give up, she started to look for a new
job immediately, but she was not able to find one. Their troubles
really started when they came to the end of savings: E’s family
cannot now afford the usual expenses and maintain the former
way of life. In the meantime, her husband fell ill and had an
emotional breakdown and had to get leave from work. The family
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had to confront the father’s illness and the related health care
costs. E tried to persuade her husband to get treatment. In the
end, she went to Caritas to get some help, mostly in order to
satisfy her family’s basic needs: overdue bills, daily shopping,
clothes, etc. She tried to protect their children from the sudden
change, maintaining the hope and the willpower to move forward.
In March 2011 she was included by Caritas in a ‘work grant’
project called “Together it weighs less,” as an accountant at a
school. Thanks to the project, she is able to integrate the salary of
the husband. The basic family needs are met by the expenses
reimbursed by the project. She is now regaining self-confidence
and slowly overcoming a difficult situation. The project is not over
yet, but some recruitment opportunities are emerging.
Extracted from: Caritas diocesana di Prato, “Prima e durante la
crisi. Un’analisi dei dati dei Centri di Ascolto Caritas dal 2006 al
2010”, Prato (FI), Novembre 2011.
Caritas Italy
Caritas Portugal draws attention to a perceived lack of hope
amongst many of the people they serve within a fast-changing
reality. For many of the families that they are supporting, it is
their first time having to seek help outside their family. Caritas
Portugal identifies an alarming increase in people seeking their
help, pointing out that those unemployed are particularly hard-
hit, and that housing issues, especially making repayments to
banks, is a major difficulty. They also point to the fact that
children are being reported by schools to be lacking food.
Portugal
There has been an enormous increase in the demand for their
services between 2011 and 2012. The figures for all Caritas
Diocesan centres throughout the country suggests that during
the first half of 2012 over 30,000 families were helped – an
increase on the figures for the same period last year. If
individuals are reckoned, the number in the first half of the
year exceeded 88,000, representing an increase of over 64%
on the same period last year (Caritas Portugal, 2012).
Caritas Portugal also points to the crisis having begun to
awaken a national awareness of the need to defend the
human rights of everyone.
Caritas Spain has had to develop new responses and reorganise
its existing systems to address the new situation that is being
confronted. Examples of these initiatives are:
5 DFC (Distribution of Food and Cleaning products)
The DFC Project operates as a low cost store. The idea arose
in an attempt to respond to the large numbers of people
contacting parishes and the volunteer teams’ efforts to
serve all of them. A premises was obtained and the project’s
main objective is to supply, at affordable prices, food,
personal hygiene products and household cleaning to
people in difficult situations. Some 50 products are made
available at 40% of the cost price and families (that have
been screened and given access for a year) are given a
Spain
monthly quota of purchases. It is all about dignifying food
distribution, and also offering an environment for meeting
and training through the team of volunteers. The volunteer
team initially numbered 10 but this has expanded.
5 Rethinking the Parish Reception – Caixa Pro-Childhood
Project
This is a new project aimed at ensuring a quality response
to the increased demands being made on parishes. It is
operating for almost four years. It has involved training for
volunteers to give them more skills in social support for
families and different approaches to organizing how support
is offered. There are two highly-motivated volunteers are in
charge.
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5 All for One – ‘Rescuing Poverty’ Fund
In response to requests for help from people unable to pay
mortgages and facing eviction, and to people becoming
unemployed, an extraordinary campaign was established in
2008, followed in early 2009 with the establishment of a
committee to manage the fund. The role of the committee is
to assess and grant-aid requests for funding which individual
parishes are unable to meet, prioritizing families with children.
The committee has also become a focal point for sharing the
different realities and experiences that are arising from the
economic crisis, something that has contributed to informing
advocacy on social policy. (For example, the demand for a
policy on basic incomes and an extension of services provided
by municipal social services). There has also been a shift of
emphasis relative to the people who are helped (who often
now do not have any income or social benefit), moving from
a once-off support to accompanying them and coordinating
with Social Services.
Monitoring and Compilation of Statistical records: Some
Caritas member organisations can demonstrate good practice
in record-keeping relative, for example, to increased use of
services since the beginning of the economic crisis. The
practice of Caritas Italy represents an example of this (Caritas
Italiana, 2012c). However, there are also challenges faced in
recording all service users across a huge range of centres and
programmes in a uniform manner.
Funding Squeeze and More Demands on Services: The
environment in which some NGOs are operating is particularly
challenging, due to funding difficulties at precisely a time when
there are increasing calls on their services. A range of funding
sources are reducing simultaneously, including church collections
even in affluent areas. In Greece, in particular, NGOs have to deal
with a much changed and less favourable taxation system that
has been introduced in recent years. Some (such as Caritas
Portugal) have to engage in different kinds of fundraising
campaigns such as audio-visual campaigns and others.
Demands on Services Requiring New Responses: New forms
of poverty that are emerging, and new situations of distress
being faced are causing Caritas member organisations to have
to develop, adapt and innovate. This appears to be an ongoing
need as new projects have to adapt as the demands continue
to increase and to change.
Challenges Faced
CONCLUS IONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
Part 4
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5 There are high levels of unemployment. The rates are well
above the EU average in four of the five countries; only
Italy’s rate is above, but closer to, the EU average than the
others; Spain and Greece have the highest rates in the
EU27, with the latest figures suggesting rates of over twice
that of the EU average.
5 There are very high youth unemployment levels (15-24
year-olds) in all five countries, with the levels in Greece
and Spain over 50%, nearly 2.5 times the EU average; this
is against a backdrop of an EU27 average level of youth
unemployment at the dramatically high level of 22.5%;
Employment/ Unemployment
increases in the year to mid-2012 were very marked in
Italy, Portugal and Spain and especially in Greece where the
percentage increase was highest of all at 10.9 percentage
points.
5 Long-term unemployment (meaning people unemployed for
more than a year) has reached its highest level in a decade
in Greece (12.3%), Ireland (9.6%), Portugal (6.9%) and
Spain (10.3%); Italy’s rate is lower but, at 5.3%, is also
above the EU average; In all countries a high proportion of
those unemployed are long-term unemployed, and this
proportion is highest in Ireland (nearly 60%).
5 Over the past year households in all five countries reported
rises in financial distress, which were particularly sharp in
Italy, followed by Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain; the
rise has been sharp amongst lower income families in
several countries (in Italy, for example). In all these countries,
with the exception of Ireland, the top 25% saw their
incomes fall by a larger proportion than was the case for the
lower quartiles ; in Ireland it was the lower quartiles that
bore the brunt in the last year.
5 While available data on poverty levels relates to the earlier
years of the crisis, rates of income poverty have risen in all
of the countries included in this report other than Italy (and
albeit only slightly in Portugal); in Spain and Greece, where
the available data is more up-to-date than in Italy or
Ireland, there has been a marked increase in the at risk of
poverty rate between 2010 and 2011.
5 Child poverty is a problem for all five countries; its rate
has begun to show an increase in all five countries, with
particularly notable increases in Spain and Ireland
5 The latest available data from Greece shows a significant
increase in poverty of older people (that is over 65s)
between 2010 and 2011.
5 A study of distributional effects of the austerity measures
introduced in the early years of the crisis (to 2011) suggests
that in Ireland, Spain and Portugal, the measures have had
a larger effect on households with children than those
without and this was particularly marked for low-income
households in Portugal (Callan et al, 2011, p 17). That same
study showed that measures taken (up to 2011) affected
poorer households in Portugal more than richer ones.
Income/ Poverty
5 Increases in VAT (often on fuel) in several countries have a
disproportionate effect on those who are poorest (Callan
et al, 2011). Since that study was completed VAT has been
raised (in countries such as Ireland) and more increases to
VAT are now planned in other countries.
5 Indebtedness of households and inability to meet financial
obligations, especially housing loans, has been registered
in many European countries since the crisis started in 2008,
and it has been particularly notable in all of the countries
that are the subject of this report, other than Italy (The
Social Protection Committee, 2012, p.32). However, within
the past year in Italy there has been a sharp increase in
households reporting financial distress (European Com-
mission, 2012, p 30).
It is predicted that as governments cut public spending and
raise taxes even more to try to address structural deficits,
household incomes will be hit for between 3 – and 10 years
depending on when growth returns (Jenkins et al, 2011, cited
in The Social Protection Committee, 2012, p. 15).
Since 2009, the EU Commission has tracked the views of
Europeans of their personal situation, the situation of the country
and of the welfare state and society (Eurobarometer on social
climate, which is conducted annually). It operates as a comple-
ment to the official socio-economic statistics. Overall the index
is at a low point in the four-year series – with an index of -0.8
(based on a scale from +10 to -10). All five of the countries with
which this report is concerned rank in the lower half of the
EU27 rankings for 2012 (European Commission, 2012, p. 44).
General trends are observable across the five countries
(Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal). There are some
similar patterns and some dissimilarities between the five
countries relating to employment and unemployment and to
income and poverty amongst vulnerable groups. Among these
are the following:
General trends
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‘The focus on ﬁscal consolidation has, in many cases,
been at the price of social policies’
Frazer & Marlier, 2012, p. 7
5 The evidence presented in this report shows that the
Policy of Prioritising Austerity is Not Working and an
alternative is required. The imposition of austerity
measures and structural reforms aimed at reducing
government borrowing and the debt/GDP ratio within a
short number of years is not working in economic terms.
Simultaneously, it is putting the social cohesion of Europe
and the very political legitimacy of the European Union at
risk. Given the requirement for a balanced budget there are
obviously situations in which austerity may be required
(such as when a country has been living beyond its means).
In such cases a reduction in expenditure would positively
impact on creating a viable economic future for that
country. However, the overall analysis presented in this
report makes it clear that a policy approach that prioritises
austerity above all else, particularly at the expense of the
weakest members of society, cannot succeed.
5 Fair Solution to the Debt-crisis must be found: The recent
EU agreement to recapitalise Spanish banks without adding
to sovereign debt (June 2012) recognises that making
taxpayers responsible for the massive debts of their banks
is unsustainable. Turning banking debt into sovereign debt
must be recognised as unfair and unsustainable for all
affected countries and a fairer burden-sharing approach
adopted.
5 Despite much public rhetoric that suggests otherwise there
has been a failure to integrate economic and social
policies at EU and national levels. This is despite the fact
that a longer-term commitment to an inclusive society is
necessary to build a truly sustainable economy. The people
currently paying the highest price are those who had no
part in the decisions that led to the crisis. The countries
worst affected include those with the biggest gaps in their
social protection systems, and as a result their welfare
systems are least able to protect their most vulnerable
populations. This process is unfair and unjust.
Main conclusions
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This Report calls on the EU institutions to Provide
Leadership in relation to Groups at particular Risk of
Poverty. Leadership is called for in finding other, and more
radical, ways to address what is a Europe-wide, and indeed a
world-wide crisis rather than pursuing the current approach in
which poor and vulnerable people across the Member States
bear the burden of economic reforms.
Leadership from the European level means a strong
commitment to the EU’s agreed strategy of “Europe 2020”
with its target of reducing poverty levels by 20 million people
by 2020. European leadership means taking responsibility for
the welfare of all European citizens, including the weakest and
most vulnerable; ensuring that the policy decisions made are
based on good information and communicated properly to
citizens; entering into dialogue with, and ensuring the
participation of citizens and Civil Society Organisations in
public processes that contribute to official policy development
and decision-making.
A new approach on the part of EU institutions requires them
to take a lead on some of the initiatives outlined below.
The EU Institutions should:
1 Ensure an adequate social dimension to the Europe
2020 Strategy process for all Member States. The Com-
mission’s policy coherence must be seriously questioned given
that the social objectives set by the Europe 2020 strategy (in
areas such as employment, education, and poverty reduction)
are at odds with the economic policies being pursued relative
to achieving the deficit reductions required under the current
austerity approach. Implicit in the approach of the Europe
2020 Strategy is that economic development, social
development and environmental protection are complementary
and interdependent – three sides of the same reality. The
following practical steps should be taken in relation to the
‘European Semester’ of the Europe 2020 Strategy:
5 Governments should be encouraged to include specific sub-
targets for poverty reduction amongst groups most at risk
of poverty or social exclusion in their National Reform
Programmes submitted to the EU Commission on an annual
basis. The groups targeted in this process might vary
somewhat from country to country but are likely to include
children, migrants, working poor, disabled people and older
1. European Institutions
people (especially older women). Progress made in reducing
poverty levels amongst these groups should be monitored
as part of the Europe 2020 Strategy Monitoring process.
Country Specific Recommendations should also be issued
by the EU to Member States proposing concrete measures
aimed at diminishing poverty among these groups. Of
particular importance in this process would be a
requirement on governments to monitor and report on how
their policy choices are assisting their countries to move
towards achieving these targets. Where this process reveals
that progress is not being made, there should be a
mechanism available to allow the relevant policy initiatives
to be revised so as to achieve the original poverty reduction
targets set.
5 The Commission should ensure proper monitoring of the
implementation of the Europe 2020 Strategy in
“Programme Countries” by adopting country specific
recommendations for these countries every year. (This does
not happen at present). These country specific recommen-
dations should not be limited to implementing the terms
of the Memorandum of Understanding entered into with
the EC/ECB/IMF, as is the current practice. The structure
of recommendations should be similar to those addressed to
other countries (that is, they should specify the actions
needed to achieve all the Europe 2020 targets, including in
relation to employment, education and poverty reduction).
2 Introduce Social Monitoring for Countries in EU/IMF
Programmes: Social impact assessments should be part of
regular reporting on the implementation of lending
programmes and/or fiscal consolidation measures. This should
include assessments that (1) consider the cumulative effects
of measures (not just their individual effects), (2) give
particular attention to the most disadvantaged groups in each
country, (3) outline policies that are aimed at reducing high
levels of inequality. The Social Protection Committee of the
European Commission has stressed the need to monitor the
social consequences of the crisis and to find new ways of
strengthening the social dimension of the Europe 2020
Strategy (2012, p 6). We endorse that approach and
recommend that more policy coherence be brought to the
agreements with the peripheral countries where the process
of working toward the social objectives of the Europe 2020
Strategy are considered integral to the objectives also being
sought in respect of debt/GDP and borrowing reduction.
We conclude this report with recommendations aimed at
European Institutions and the European Commission, National
and Local Governments, and NGOs (non-governmental
organisations). We finish with some comments on the role and
commitment of Caritas and the Catholic Church.
Recommendations
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3 Ensure that the 2014-2020 EU Structural Funds will
play a bigger role in addressing poverty and encouraging social
inclusion across Member States in order to better respond to
the worsening social situation of many Europeans. The use of
European Structural Funds shouldn’t replace the responsibility
of national governments to ensure that their policies and
budgets effectively target poverty. Instead the availability of
EU Structural Funds should provide necessary European
solidarity with the most vulnerable people and regions, and
complement the use of national resources. The European
Social Fund is the main source for funding projects aimed at
the Active Inclusion of the most vulnerable, linking them with
access to employment, basic services and minimum income
schemes. Therefore, the EU Cohesion Budget (2014-2020)
should not be further reduced as this would make it incapable
of responding to current and future needs. The minimum
allocation of 25% of the Cohesion Policy funds to the
European Social Fund (ESF) should be ensured and at least
20% of the ESF budget should be earmarked for social
inclusion and the fight against poverty. Moreover, the Fund of
2.5 billion for European Aid to the Most Deprived should be
kept in a separate budget within the overall Cohesion Policy
budget. The European Commission should ensure that the
allocation of EU funds to assist Member States in meeting
their anti-poverty targets, complementing other national
social policies, is actually happening. This can be measured by
conducting quality audits of ‘co-financed’ actions. EU
Structural Funds can also be used to support initiatives
dedicated to creating employment in the ‘Social Economy’.
This sector offers valuable employment opportunities for
people from various marginalised or vulnerable groups.
Leadership and support from the EU for other employment
initiatives (e.g. the creation of jobs in care services across
EU Member States) would benefit people requiring care and
those seeking employment.
4 Take a Lead in tackling Child Poverty: Child poverty is
a significant and worsening problem in the countries whose
situations are reviewed in this report. There has been some
momentum at a European level relative to a coordinated
approach to tackling child poverty. The Social Protection
Committee notes however that there is a danger that this
momentum will be lost as a result of the current crisis, with
services and policies being affected by cutbacks (2012a). It is
vital that the Commission issues its planned ‘Recommendation
on Child Poverty’ immediately. This Recommendationmust be
made a policy priority for the countries that are the subject of
this report, including those involved in EU/ECB/IMF assistance
packages.
5 More attention should be also paid by the EU institutions
to policies supporting other groups in need such as long-
term unemployed, people with health problems and
disabilities, lone parents, immigrants and Roma. Strong
leadership in Respect of Youth Unemployment should also
be ensured. This would involve publishing the proposed
Council recommendation for ‘youth guarantees’ aiming to
ensure that all young people are in employment, education or
training within four months of leaving school (European
Commission, 2012b) and making sufficient structural funds
available to assist those countries (including Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Portugal and Spain), where youth unemployment is
highest, to ensure the social inclusion of their young people.
6 Ensure Civil Society involvement in Governance
Structures: The Charter on Shared Social Responsibilities,
currently being considered by the Council of Europe, argues
that having a well-defined deliberative process can ensure,
among other things, that individual preferences are reconciled
with widespread priorities in the field of social, environmental
and intergenerational justice. It can also reduce the ‘imba-
lances of power between stakeholders’ (Council of Europe,
2011, p 24). The Commission should require evidence of
meaningful stakeholder involvement (such as civil society
organisations) in deliberative processes leading to the
formulation, implemen-tation and ongoing monitoring of
policies under the monitoring systems in place under the
Europe 2020 Strategy. (It should also strengthen those
processes relative to EU/IMF programme countries, as
recommended above). This is of particular importance in a
European Union faced with the biggest threat to social
cohesion and political legitimacy in its existence.
Note: The recommendations in this section are addressed to
National Governments and also to local authorities and
municipalities, wherever they have the power to act in relation
to the areas covered).
1 Strengthen Welfare Systems: Given the depth and duration
of the economic crisis and the impacts of structural measures,
the resilience of social protection systems must be improved
to enable them to provide protection to the entire population
in need. This is an urgent requirement in countries included in
this report with significant gaps in safety nets such as where
2. National Governments and relevant Local/Regional Authorities
access to unemployment benefits/assistance is restricted for
some groups or is subject to time limits. An example is Italy
where there is a need to ensure that there is a minimum
income policy to provide an integrated approach that ensures
a safety net for everyone (as Caritas Italy has called for over a
long period of time). Policy-makers should now introduce
social protection schemes for the future which overcome the
present inequalities within the system, which, in many countries,
result in non-standard workers, young people, and new entrants
suffering a double disadvantage, being more vulnerable to
unemployment and also entitled to less social protection.
2 Strengthen Essential Services: Social protection transfers
and provision of quality services (like affordable childcare,
education, health, disability and other social services) are
crucial to the employability prospects and social mobility of
different income groups as they indirectly reduce inequalities,
so ensuring equal access to service and care, strengthen social
cohesion and ensure social stability (The Social Protection
Committee, 2012, p 28, 50). However, the economic crisis and
austerity measures are worsening existing inequalities in
income and in access to services and care. Social assessments
of the impacts of cuts to services that focus beyond the short-
term cost saving should be integrated into decision-making
processes. Many of the decisions being made currently to
achieve short-term budgetary savings are choices that may
well make social cohesion more difficult in the long-term.
3 Poverty Proof All New Measures: Reducing poverty requires
a number of different, integrated responses including income
support and access to education and other vital services. With
regard to child poverty, the Social Protection Committee has
noted the important role that universal measures have played
in reducing child poverty in many states. Amongst the
measures needed are maintenance of all existing universal
benefits paid to the main carer coupled with other measures.
Access to services like early childhood care and education are
also essential supports. Of particular importance in this
context is the need to recognise and monitor the effect that
cumulative ‘hits’ can have on particular groups. This is the
situation where a range of decisions are made that impact on
the same group and have a disproportionate effect.
4 Use Appropriate Labour Market Active Inclusion Measures:
EU recommendations commit to a balanced approach to active
inclusion involving three equally important pillars: inclusive
labour markets, adequate income support and access to high-
quality services (European Commission, 2008). However, the
Independent Network of Experts on Social Inclusion has
concluded that in reality the focus of European countries is
on activation measures at the expense of the other pillars
(Frazer & Marlier, 2012). With pressure on social welfare
systems high, most of the countries under review in this report
are pursuing measures involving support to job-seekers and
activation of some kind. Given the scale of the fall in
employment in all countries and the bleak outlook for job
creation, it is important that these measures focus on
supporting unemployed people. This might for example aim to
maintain and develop appropriate skills. Most importantly,
such measures must not be accompanied by the threatened
loss of welfare benefit or assistance, as, with the scale of the
losses in employment, this is illogical and will merely cause
poverty and worsening desperation.
5 Frame any further measures such that those who can
afford to do so actually do pay more: National Governments
(and regional authorities/municipalities as appropriate to their
roles) must adopt approaches to raising revenue and providing
services that do not disproportionately negatively affect low
income groups. The Social Protection Committee has argued
that there is scant evidence that a shift to indirect taxes on
consumption would have a strong revenue-generating effect
(2012, p 45). In this report we have included instances of how
shifting the tax burden from labour to consumption (by
increasing VAT and/or excise on essential items) caused
proportionately larger losses on low-income households in
several countries (as low-income households spend a relatively
higher proportion of their income on goods, like fuel/energy,
on which they are levied). This means, amongst other things,
that any proposed increases in indirect taxes on consumption
(like VAT) must be very carefully considered.
6 Consider new ways of cooperation between national/
regional/local Governments, enterprises, NGOs and trade
unions in order to create new employment, and also socially
useful work and jobs of last resort: Given the huge fall in
employment identified in this report and the impact this is
having among unemployed people of every age, and
recognising that governments want to increase the number of
long-term viable jobs paying good wages in their own
countries, governments should identify good practices in other
countries and cities and search for new ways of cooperation
between all stakeholders: enterprises, trade unions, social
NGOs and public administration, addressing needs at local
level and creating employment. In the context of this dialogue
governments should still contemplate being an employer of
last resort through voluntary programmes that do not distort
the market economy but provide some socially useful work for
the millions currently seeking employment. The lessons of the
Great Depression are as valid in social terms now as they were
in the 1930s. No country, no society can afford to regard so
many of its unemployed citizens as expendable. There are
many areas in which such employment could be created in the
social economy (for example, in long-term care). This should
not be misunderstood to mean that social services should be
dependent on people who are long-term unemployed taking
up positions on a government programme. These services
should be provided as part of mainstream provision. However,
this approach does have the potential for adding capacity,
particularly at a time of economic difficulty. In Appendix 8 we
consider the issue of a jobs guarantee in some more detail and
include some examples of implementation in different
contexts.
7 Ensure the involvement of Civil Society Organisations
and People Experiencing Poverty in Governance: Commit to
a genuine engagement with stakeholders to ensure that
groups at risk of poverty and social exclusion can influence
policy-direction and implementation, and that their experien-
ces become part of the dialogue with European and
International agencies (like the EU/ECB/IMF troika), to try and
bolster social cohesion and political legitimacy.
8 Introduce Better Monitoring and Planning: Introduce
poverty proofing relative to new measures, and address their
longer term consequences as well as their short-term ones;
use macroeconomic modelling processes to assess the impact
of proposed changes in social policies.
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1 Accompany and help people in need; provide services
in order to promote their social and active inclusion :
People who are poor need help here and now. NGOs can assist
a society to identify people in need and to develop solutions
to address their immediate and longer-term needs. NGOs can
mobilise solidarity in society, organise volunteers and innovate
within the limits of existing resources.
2 Give a Voice to People Experiencing Poverty or Social
Exclusion: Those NGOs that provide services to people
experiencing poverty are in a position to give a voice to the
experience of the people they serve, a voice that tends to have
few outlets for expression or influence – and these accounts
can have an impact within and beyond individual national
borders. This might involve documenting accounts of staff or,
in some cases (and with care), first-hand accounts by service
users. However, working with the media has to be approached
with skill and, as is obvious, with particular sensitivity if
service users are to be part of the process if they are not to be
compromised.
3 Document Increases in Service Use: The current situation
is challenging and unfolding rapidly. Official systems for
tracking and monitoring poverty are subject to limitations and
time-lags. NGOs who work in providing services can, by
putting appropriate systems in place, track the increased
demands– and the new kinds of demands - made on their
3. Non-Governmental Organisations – Not for proﬁt Social Services Providers:
services. Thus they can help to provide an earlier and more
rounded view of the picture as it emerges as well as make the
case to protect existing funding streams.
4 Work for Social Change: The world documented in this
report is not just. It needs to be profoundly changed in a way
that eliminates poverty and exclusion as well as addressing
unemployment in a sustainable manner. A model of
development that is sustainable in economic, social and
environmental terms is required. NGOs have great experience
and knowledge of the impacts the current approach is having
on so many people who are vulnerable in one form or another.
They must use that experience and knowledge to work towards
the articulation and development of a sustainable future that
protects human dignity, promotes wellbeing, is built on the
common good and protects the environment.
5 Work to Influence Decision-Making: NGOs must seek to
challenge the official approach to the crisis in which those
who are vulnerable are paying the highest price. This may
require a commitment to develop a capacity for independent
and accurate analysis and advocacy, which is sometimes
considered secondary to the work of providing services.
However, it is an important means of addressing the causes
of the problem, not only its symptoms. This is especially
valuable when the major providers of social analysis do not, in
practice, include data, analysis or proposals targeting the
situations of those who are vulnerable.
This report has been commissioned by Caritas Europa, a
Catholic organisation which acts to help people, particularly
those who are poor, vulnerable or excluded. It responds to “the
teaching and most ancient practice of the Church in her
conviction that she is obliged by her vocation - she herself, her
ministers and each of her members - to relieve misery and
suffering, both near and far.” (Sollicitudo Rei Socialis 31). It
operates from the tradition which “allows faith, theology,
metaphysics and science to come together in a collaborative
effort in the service of humanity” (Caritas in Veritate 31).
According to Pope Benedict XVI, “The Church's charitable
organisations, beginning with those of Caritas (at diocesan,
national and international levels), ought to do everything in
their power to provide the resources and above all the personnel
needed for this work” (Deus Caritas Est 31a). Caritas Europa
member organisations work extensively in all five countries
covered by this report as well as in more than 40 other
countries across Europe, including all 27 member countries of
the EU, responding to the challenges currently being faced.
Role and Commitment
of Caritas,
as expression of the service of the Catholic Church
In its work Caritas is building on the long and wide tradition
of Catholic Social Thought expressed in many Papal and other
Church documents and carried forward into action by a great
many committed organisations and individuals at local, regional,
national and international levels. The Catholic Social Thought
tradition has long highlighted the importance of addressing
both the causes and the consequences of poverty and
exclusion and this is being carried through in practice today by
Caritas across Europe and the wider world through action,
prayer and advocacy, bringing together social justice, peace
and charity.
In this context a threefold action based on values has to
be developed by Caritas and Church: with Christian
communities, with society and with political stakeholders.
A number of key areas have been identified in which Caritas
and Church at different levels can play a responsible role:
1 Help and accompany the people in need: “Following the
example given in the parable of the Good Samaritan, Christian
charity is first of all the simple response to immediate needs and
specific situations: feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, caring
for and healing the sick, visiting those in prison, etc.” (Deus
Caritas Est 31). Caritas organisations from the local level on,
the volunteers and staff in parishes and in social and health
services, will be always there to give immediate help and to
ensure a pathway towards the autonomy of the person and
their active inclusion in society. It is from this deep experience
of human encounter at grassroots level that Caritas commits
with the further mentioned roles.
1 Articulate and promote the protection of human dignity:
Human dignity is at the core of the Catholic Social Thought
tradition. The Second Vatican Council reminded us that “the
dignity and total vocation of the human person must be
honoured and advanced along with the welfare of society as a
whole.” (Gaudium et Spes 63) Promotion and protection of
human dignity should always be at the core of the choices
Governments make, particularly in difficult situations. As
outlined in this report the basics required to protect human
dignity are not available to large numbers of people in the
crisis countries and their situation is becoming more difficult
as time passes. This situation must be reversed. While we all
have a responsibility, the choices made by Governments must
prioritise the protection of human dignity.
2 Argue for the common good: In difficult times there is
always a danger that democracy will become a democratic
tyranny in which the majority oppresses the minority. It is very
necessary that the general public have an understanding of
the common good and the concepts that underlie it. The
Church’s understanding of the common good is articulated by
the Vatican Council when it says “the common good embraces
the sum of those conditions of social life by which individuals,
families, and groups can achieve their own fulfillment in a
relatively thorough and ready way.” (Gaudium et Spes 74) It is
critical that public opinion support this principle, otherwise,
they will be unlikely to support actions by public authorities
that are not to the immediate advantage of the powerful and
vocal. Individuals have a claim on each other and on society
for certain basic minimum conditions without which the value
of human life is diminished or even negated. Those rights are
inalienable, in that individuals and societies may not set them
at nought. This is why the Church argues for the common
good and works as best it can with others to place the
common good at the centre of decision-making.
3 Promote solidarity as a guiding principle in the relationship
between all groups in society: Pope Benedict XVI tells us
“Solidarity is first and foremost a sense of responsibility on the
part of everyone with regard to everyone”. (Caritas in Veritate
38) Solidarity means the willingness to see others as of equal
importance to ourselves and so to regard injustice committed
against another as no less serious than an injustice against
ourselves. Church has a responsibility to exercise an influence
on behalf of what it believes to be true and good, especially in
solidarity with people everywhere who are on low incomes,
disabled, ill or infirm, homeless or poorly housed, in prison,
migrants, refugees, or people who are otherwise vulnerable,
powerless and at a disadvantage. This is especially true in the
context outlined in this report.
4 Foster and ensure participation and create communion,
being open towards everybody in a spirit of ecumenical
charity. This means to involve and engage as many people as
possible, including volunteers, in taking action to address
these issues: Loving one’s neighbour is at the centre of the
Christian message. Flowing from this the Catholic Social
Thought tradition highlights the importance of people doing
what they can to tackle the poverty and exclusion experienced
by so many of their fellow human beings. Having reminded us
that charity goes beyond justice, Pope Benedict XVI says that
“the individual who is animated by true charity labours skilfully
to discover the causes ofmisery, to find themeans to combat it,
to overcome it resolutely”. (Caritas in Veritate 30). In all of
this it is very important to acknowledge the central role of
volunteers who “assume responsibility for providing a variety of
services” (Deus Caritas Est 30b).
5 Ensure that Catholic people across the European Union
take up the challenge of applying in their own lives and in
their spheres of influence all the principles of Catholic Social
Teaching and thus advance the common good in collaboration
with like-minded citizens of every political and religious
allegiance and none: The political arena should give priority to
the common good. Governments should not be allowed to give
way to utilitarian expediency and the pursuit of short-term
gains which have dangerous long-term consequences. Society
must not be allowed to turn its back on poor people nor on the
stranger at the gate. These are core values in the Catholic Social
Thought tradition and they are as relevant today as they have
even been.
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Appendix 1 Gross Debt, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain
Appendices
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
EU (27 countries) 62.3 62.8 61.6 59 62.2 74.6 80 82.5
Greece 98.6 100 106.1 107.4 112.9 129.7 148.3 170.6
Ireland 29.4 27.2 24.5 24.8 44.5 64.9 92.2 106.4
Italy 103.4 105.7 106.3 103.3 106.1 116.4 119.2 120.7
Portugal 61.9 67.7 69.4 68.4 71.7 83.2 93.5 108.1
Spain 46.3 43.2 39.7 36.3 40.2 53.9 61.5 69.3
Source: Eurostat, 2012j, tsdde410
General Government Gross Debt, 2004-2011 % GDP
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
EU (27 countries) 6613633 6963230 7214104 7319610 7763975 8764582 9826981 10433926
Greece 183157 195421 224204 239300 263284 299682 329513 355658
Ireland 44255.1 44443.3 43765.5 47161.2 79607.9 104630.9 144226.9 169231.9
Italy 1445858 1518556 1587781 1605126 1670993 1769226 1851217 1906738
Portugal 92442 104407.3 111689.8 115786.4 123302 140225.7 161529.9 184699.3
Spain 389142 392497 391055 382307 436984 565082 644692 736468
Source: Eurostat, 2012j, tsdde410
General Government Gross Debt, 2004-2011 €millions
Appendix 2 Government Deficit/Surplus 2004-2011, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
European Union (27 countries) -2.9 -2.5 -1.5 -0.9 -2.4 -6.9 -6.5 -4.4
Greece -7.5 -5.2 -5.7 -6.5 -9.8 -15.6 -10.7 -9.4
Ireland 1.4 1.7 2.9 0.1 -7.4 -13.9 -30.9 -13.4
Italy -3.5 -4.4 -3.4 -1.6 -2.7 -5.4 -4.5 -3.9
Portugal -4.0 -6.5 -4.6 -3.1 -3.6 -10.2 -9.8 -4.4
Spain -0.1 1.3 2.4 1.9 -4.5 -11.2 -9.7 -9.4
Source: Eurostat, 2012k gov_dd_edpt1
Government deficit/surplus, % GDP
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Greece -13,940 -10,068 -12,109 -14,475 -22,880 -36,125 -23,732 -19,686
Ireland 2,065.8 2,711.2 5,182.7 124.1 -13,160 -22,484.1 -48,297.3 -21,255.8
Italy -49,361 -63,918 -51,188 -25,273 -42,700 -82,752 -69,270 -61,758
Portugal -5,988.3 -10,069.8 -7,408.2 -5,332.8 -6,235.6 -17,103.3 -16,950.1 -7,525
Spain -941 11,511 23,349 20,255 -48,897 -117,143 -101,438 -100,402
Source: Eurostat, 2012k gov_dd_edpt1
Government deficit/surplus, 2004-2011, millions of Euro
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Appendix 3 Poverty Rates according to Four different Indicators – Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
EU (27 countries) 25.6 25.2 24.4 23.5 23.1 23.4
Greece 30.9 29.4 29.3 28.3 28.1 27.6 27.7
Ireland 24.8 25 23.3 23.1 23.7 25.7 29.9
Italy 26.4 25 25.9 26 25.3 24.7 24.5
Portugal 27.5 26.1 25 25 26 24.9 25.3 24.4
Spain 24.4 23.4 23.3 23.1 22.9 23.4 25.5 27
Source: Eurostat, 2012c: t2020_50
1. People at Risk of Poverty or Social Exclusion, %
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
EU (27 countries) 16.4 16.5 16.5 16.4 16.3 16.4
Greece 20.7 19.9 19.6 20.5 20.3 20.1 19.7 20.1 21.4
Ireland 20.5 20.9 19.7 18.5 17.2 15.5 15 16.1
Italy 19.1 18.9 19.6 19.8 18.7 18.4 18.2
Portugal 19 20.4 19.4 18.5 18.1 18.5 17.9 17.9 18
Spain 19 19.9 19.7 19.9 19.7 19.6 19.5 20.7 21.8
Source: Eurostat, 2012c: t2020_52
2. People at Risk of Poverty, %.
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
EU (27 countries) 10.7 9.8 9.1 8.4 8.1 8.1
Greece 16.9 14.1 12.8 11.5 11.5 11.2 11 11.6 15.2
Ireland 5.6 4.8 5.1 4.8 4.5 5.5 6.1 7.5
Italy 6.9 6.4 6.3 6.8 7.5 7 6.9
Portugal 9.9 9.3 9.1 9.6 9.7 9.1 9 8.3
Spain 4.3 3.4 3.4 3 2.5 3.5 4 3.9
Source: Eurostat, 2012c: t2020_53
3. People Severely Materially Deprived, %
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
EU (27 countries) 10.3 10.5 9.6 9 9 10
Ireland 12.8 14.6 12.8 14.2 13.6 19.8 22.9
Greece 7.4 7.5 8 8 7.4 6.5 7.5 11.8
Italy 12 10.3 10.8 10 9.8 8.8 10.2
Portugal 6.9 5.9 6.6 7.2 6.3 6.9 8.6 8.2
Spain 7.2 6.5 6 6.3 6.2 7 9.8 12.2
Source: Eurostat, 2012c: t2020_51
4. People Living in Households with very low work intensity, %
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Appendix 5 At Risk of Poverty Thresholds, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Greece 6,120 6,480 6,897 7,178 6,591
Ireland 13,239 13,797 13,467 11,929
Italy 9,003 9,383 9,382 9,562 :
Portugal 4,544 4,886 4,969 5,207 5,046
Spain 7,223 7,770 7,980 7,818 7,509
Source: Eurostat, 2012h, [ilc_li01]
At Risk of Poverty Threshold (€) (60% of median equivalised income), Single person
Appendix 6 GDP Growth Rates, 2003-2013, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012(f) 2013(f)
EU (27 countries) 1.5 2.5 2.1 3.3 3.2 0.3 -4.3 2.1 1.5 -0.3 0.4
Greece 5.9 4.4 2.3 5.5 3.5 -0.2 -3.1 -4.9 -7.1 -6.0 -4.2
Ireland 3.9 4.4 5.9 5.4 5.4 -2.1 -5.5 -0.8 1.4 0.4 1.1
Italy 0 1.7 0.9 2.2 1.7 -1.2 -5.5 1.8 0.4 -2.3 -0.5
Portugal -0.9 1.6 0.8 1.4 2.4 0 -2.9 1.4 -1.7 -3.0 -1.0
Spain 3.1 3.3 3.6 4.1 3.5 0.9 -3.7 -0.3 0.4 -1.4 -1.4
Eurostat, 2012a, tec00115; F: forecast from European Commission, 2012b. Figures for Greece described as provisional for each year.
Real GDP growth rate - volume - Percentage change on previous year
People at Risk of Poverty (%), 2010-2011 (EU27)
Appendix 4 At Risk of Poverty Rates, EU27
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Appendix 7 Unemployment, September 2012, EU27
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In this Appendix we introduce and discuss the issue of Jobs Guarantee Schemes and afterwards provide two contrasting examples of their
implementation.
1. Job Guarantee Schemes – General Introduction
Unemployment is one of the most serious issues facing the EU at the moment, particularly where its youth is concerned. Unemployment
gives rise to increased poverty, a greater prevalence of mental health problems and growing levels of social exclusion. High levels of
unemployment across the EU co-exist with significant potential employment opportunities in, for example, the conservation and development
of the social and environmental capital of EU Member States. This paradox could be solved by a positive innovation known as the Job Guarantee
Scheme (JGS). This describes a jobs programme in which the State assumes the role of ‘employer of last resort’ in the event that unemployed
individuals opt to avail of structured employment opportunities. Under such schemes, employment opportunities are created in areas not
currently undertaken by either the public or the private sector. The extensive academic literature on job guarantee schemes provide numerous
examples of possible positions that could be filled, such as school classroom assistants; safety monitors; neighbourhood clean-up; low-income
housing restoration; library assistants; community or cultural historians; musicians and event organizers.
Such schemes would not subsidise private sector jobs or threaten to undercut unionised public sector jobs. Any jobs with a set rate of pay or
in the private sector should not be considered for the programme. Only those jobs that directly benefit the public purpose and do not impinge
on other workers would be considered .This would mean that when unemployed workers are channelled into these sectors, it would not result
in a ‘crowding out effect’ for other workers.
A Job Guarantee Scheme is not conceived as a means to replace other social programmes such as social welfare. Many people are not able to take
up a job and safety nets for these people must be kept in place. However, Job Guarantee Schemes could complement a social support system such
as the Unconditional Basic Income, and provide individuals with a low level of income security while they transition from unemployment to a state-
sponsored employment scheme and ultimately back into the open labour market if or when jobs become available on the scale across the economy.
Large-scale jobs programmes have been successful in the past in kick- starting flagging economies. The most famous of these was the Work
Progress Administration (WPA) enacted under Franklin Delano Roosevelt during the Great Depression47. A more recent example is the Jefes
program which was enacted under the administration of Nestor Kirchner in Argentina after the economic collapse that took place there in
200148. There is no legal impediment under the Maastricht or Lisbon Treaties of which Caritas is aware that would prevent the governments
of EU Member States from implementing such a measure.
Source: extract from Caritas Europa, 2012a
2. Two Examples – one from France (with a youth focus initiated by Government), and one from Ireland (initiated by an
NGO and mainstreamed by Government)
2.1. France: Emplois D’Avenir
In France a new initiative aimed at young people from disadvantaged areas has been introduced called Emplois D’Avenir. It was an initiative
of the French Government approved by Parliament in October 2012 to create 150,000 jobs for young people. Features:
5 The programme aims to create 100,000 jobs in 2013 and a further 50,000 in 2014.
5 Jobs will primarily be open in the public sector, local authorities and other associations, foundations or businesses in non-commercial
activities with a social purpose.
5 The sectors favoured for job creation are those labelled by the European Commission as areas with largest potential for future job growth
i.e. green economy, health services and ICT.
5 The jobs will be aimed at young people aged 16-25 without degrees from deprived urban and rural areas or areas hit by high unemployment.
The estimated cost is €1.5b.
5 The jobs will be full-time, or fixed term contract of 3 years and the recipients will be paid at least the minimum wage, of which 75% of
the gross wage will be funded by the State.
These full-time jobs, which are planned to last a maximum of five years and are paid at least the minimum wage (SMIC), will be 75% funded by
the State, with the rest of the cost being borne by local authorities, associations, foundations and business. Based on the assumption that two-
thirds of the “jobs for the future” created would be in the non-market sector and one-third in the market sector, the total average annual cost
for the public finances therefore comes to 23,015 euros per contract. When fully implemented, the cost of creating 150,000 “jobs for the future”
is estimated at 3.45 billion euros a year.
Impact
By assuming the creation of 100,000 subsidized jobs in the non-market sector and 50,000 in the market sector, the impact would be as follows:
With relatively weak deadweight and substitution effects in the non-market sector (20% according to Fontaine and Malherbet, 2012), 100,000
“jobs for the future” would lead to the net creation of 80,000 jobs over the presidential term. The ex-ante annual cost to the public finances
for 100,000 “jobs for the future” in the non-market sector would be 0.12 GDP, but ex post this would be only 0.07 GDP because of the extra
income – and thus tax and social security revenue – generated by the jobs created.
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47 www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1589.html
48 http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_534.pdf. For an appraisal, see http://www.epicoalition.org/docs/ArgentinaJefes.htm
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The state aid (75% of the gross salary) allows a reduction in the cost of labour of 52% at the SMIC level, i.e. a total reduction of 71% of the
actual cost of a minimum wage job if one includes the reductions in charges. With the impact of employment elasticities at a maximum labour
cost at the level of the SMIC (1.2 according to a DGTPE study in 2007), the 50,000 “jobs of the future” in the market sector would generate
27,300 jobs. The ex-ante cost to the public finances would be 0.05 GDP point, and 0.03 GDP point ex post.
Ultimately, the measure would eventually create 107,300 jobs (about 25% of these in the market sector), i.e. an annual net creation of 72%.
The ex-ante cost for the public finances would be 0.17 GDP point, but the ex-post impact of the measure on the public balance would be only
-0.1 GDP point because of the extra tax and social security revenue generated by the jobs created and the consequent income gains (Table 1).
Source: OFCE, The Collective Blog of the French Economic Observatory: Youth Jobs of the Future: What Impact on employment and Government
Finances < http://www.ofce.sciences-po.fr/blog/?p=2468%23more-2468.>
2.2. Ireland: Part-time Jobs Initiative, Social Justice Ireland
A programme piloted by the current Directors of Social Justice Ireland, Seán Healy and Brigid Reynolds, from 1994-1998 created 1,000 part-time
jobs paying the ‘going hourly rate’ for the job. The jobs were open to a number of categories of people who were unemployed. They worked the
number of hours necessary to earn their social welfare payment plus a small top-up. After that they were free to seek further employment and,
of course, pay tax on the money they earned in the normal way but they were entitled to continue receiving their secondary benefits (e.g. medical
card). The programme was taken on by 162 organisations and was extremely successful. 500 of the original 1,000 employees left during the course
of the programme – almost all of these took up full-time employment. These were all replaced by others who fitted the criteria for participants.
The programme was piloted in six very different pilot city, town, rural and the islands off the coast. There was huge demand for the programme
and there was always a waiting list of eligible candidates.
Social Justice Ireland has proposed on a number of occasions during the current crisis that the Irish Government create 100,000 part-time
jobs in the public sector and in the community and voluntary sector following the model piloted in the 1994-98 period.
Outline of the programme
This programme would enable unemployed people to be employed on a part time basis:
5 In the public sector (e.g. local authorities, Government departments, the healthcare and educational authorities) and the community and
voluntary sector
5 Voluntarily
5 Doing work of public or social value which is not being done or is only partly being done at present
5 At the hourly ‘going rate for the job’
5 For as many hours as would give them a net income equivalent to what they were receiving from jobseekers allowance (i.e. their basic social
welfare payment) plus an additional €20 a week. (They would work for a minimum of 8 hours and a maximum of 19.5 hours.)
5 The person taking up the new position would lose none of his/her other social welfare entitlements
5 Once the required number of hours had been worked, the person would be free to do whatever she/he wished for the remainder of the week
5 The money paid to the person filling the new position would be reallocated to the employing organisation by the Department for Social Protection
5 The employer would be encouraged to give extra hours to the worker who would be taxed accordingly
5 If the person received further income from another job, this income would be assessed for tax purposes in the normal way
5 To protect against a ‘deadweight effect’ no position could be created if a person had been employed to do this particular work at any point
during the previous two years
Eligibility
The Programme would be available to:
5 All recipients of jobseekers allowance
5 All recipients of jobseekers benefit after 6 months
Voluntary nature of the programme
The voluntary nature of the programme is considered very important from the point of view of the worker and the employer. It must not have
any of the characteristics of ‘workfare’.
5 From the viewpoint of the worker, he/she must freely choose to come on the programme, and must be free to leave if he/she chooses, subject
only to normal requirements with regard to notice to the employer
5 From the point of view of the employer, there must be free choice in selecting workers from among those eligible for the programme. The
employer should also be free to select the number of workers required. This ensures that the work offered is real. The pilot programme
showed that there would be more demand for these jobs than there were positions to accommodate them
To protect the voluntary nature of the programme and to ensure that the work is real the following would be expected:
5 Positions should be advertised publicly by the employing body, through local media, or any other method used in the local area.
5 A job description would be provided.
5 Workers should be interviewed for the positions.
5 Written job contracts should be provided.
5 Employers would not be pressurised to take more workers than they need.
5 Leaving a particular job would not prejudice a worker seeking to participate in another project or training programme.
EU27 The 27 countries who are members of the European Union. These
include Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
Government Deficit/ Surplus The government deficit/surplus is the net
borrowing/net lending of general government. It is the difference between
the total revenue and the total expenditure of the general government sector.
What is included in it is set out in detail in the European System of Accounts
‘95 (Eurostat, gov_dd_esms).
Government Debt The government debt is defined as the total consolidated
gross debt at nominal value at the end of the year in the following categories
of government liabilities: currency and deposits, securities other than shares
excluding financial derivatives, and loans. What is included in it is set out in
detail in the European System of Accounts ‘95 (Eurostat, gov_dd_esms).
In-work-at-risk-of-poverty rate This is defined by Eurostat as the share of
persons who are at work and have an equivalised disposable income below the
risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60 % of the national median
equivalised disposable income (after social transfers) (Eurostat, 2012g)
People at risk-of-poverty Persons are at risk of poverty if they have an
equivalised disposable income below the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is
generally set at 60 % of the national median equivalised disposable income
(after social transfers) (Eurostat, 2012c). It is also possible to examine the
dispersion around the at-risk-of-poverty threshold by looking at people with
an equivalised disposable income below respectively 40%, 50%, 60% and
70% of the national median equivalised disposable income (Eurostat, 2012d)
People at Risk of Poverty or Social Exclusion The combined indicator used
under the Europe 2020 strategy. This indicator corresponds to the sum of
persons who (1) are at risk of poverty or (2) severely materially deprived or (3)
living in households with very low work intensity. Persons are only counted
once even if they are present in several sub-indicators (Eurostat, 2012c)
Relative median at-risk-of-poverty gap is a measure of the depth of poverty.
It is calculated as the difference between the median equivalised disposable
income of people below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold and the at-risk-of-
poverty threshold, expressed as a percentage of the at-risk-of-poverty
threshold (cut-off point: 60 % of national median equivalised disposable
income) (Eurostat).
Severely Materially Deprived Material deprivation covers poverty indicators
relating to economic strain and durables. Severely materially deprived persons
have living conditions severely constrained by a lack of resources; they are
deprived of at least 4 out of 9 following items: cannot afford i) to pay rent or
utility bills, ii) keep home adequately warm, iii) face unexpected expenses, iv)
eat meat, fish or a protein equivalent every second day, v) a week holiday
away from home, vi) a car, vii) a washing machine, viii) a colour TV, or ix) a
telephone (Eurostat, 2012c).
The Stability and Growth Pact was introduced as part of the Maastricht
Treaty in 1992, and set limits upon member countries' budget deficits and
levels of public debt at 3 % t and 60% of GDP respectively
Very Low Work Intensity People living in households with very low work
intensity are those aged 0-59 living in any households where the adults (aged
18-59) work less than 20% of their total work potential during the past year
(Eurostat, 2012c).
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